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 MYTHS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 




Environmental law is pervaded by myths—i.e., assumptions that are 
inaccurate, misleading, or false. These myths arise in various contexts, 
ranging from wetlands mitigation schemes and pollution credit trading 
programs to legal regimes premised on the concept of sustainability. This 
Article explores several myths of environmental law, their origins, and 
their roles. While political reasons explain in part the creation and 
prevalence of these myths, more is at work behind these myths than mere 
politics or failures to implement the law. The myths of environmental law 
facilitate the management of ecologically complex systems by providing 
a reductionist account of them. Beyond that, these myths serve important 
expressive functions in communicating social attitudes and values, 
legitimating social institutions and practices, and maintaining social 
solidarity. Awareness of myth’s roles in environmental law can enable 
society to address legal shortcomings that are thereby revealed and to 
reject or replace those myths that undermine environmental law’s goals. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Environmental law is pervaded by myths and half-truths. By this, I mean that a 
number of its regulatory regimes rest on assumptions or beliefs that are inaccurate, 
unlikely, or arguably false. Perhaps the most obvious example—one that has been 
the subject of much recent scholarly handwringing—is the goal of sustainability, 
which plays an especially prominent role in international environmental law but 
often appears in domestic environmental discourse as well. At best, the concept of 
sustainability represents a lofty, though unrealistic, goal. At worst, it is a deceptive 
device that further entrenches existing practices of production and consumption. 
Whereas sustainability remains largely an animating principle rather than a 
legal mandate, other myths are expressed more directly and explicitly in 
environmental law. For example, several statutes mandate regulation of 
environmental harms without regard to economic costs. The implementation of these 
statutes strays from these mandates, however, and calls into question the feasibility 
of cost-blind regulation. Another widespread myth minimizes the role of individuals 
* © 2015 Albert C. Lin. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of 
Law. Thanks to Dean Kevin Johnson, Associate Dean Vik Amar, and the U.C. Davis School 
of Law for financial support for this project; to participants at the 16th Institute for Natural 
Resources Law Teachers (sponsored by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and 
the ABA Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources) for their thoughtful questions and 
comments; and to William Stanger and Erin Tanimura for their valuable research assistance. 
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in causing environmental problems. Many environmental statutes focus instead on 
industrial polluters. In doing so, these statutes neglect the contribution of individuals 
to environmental harm and thereby perpetuate the myth that pollution from 
individuals and other sources is negligible.  
Other prominent myths involve frequently used environmental policy tools 
such as mitigation programs and pollution credits. Ideally, mitigation compensates 
for environmentally damaging activities such as the destruction of wetlands or 
habitat. However, scholars often have serious doubts as to whether mitigation truly 
compensates for the harm caused. Likewise, pollution credits theoretically represent 
the avoidance of pollution that would otherwise have occurred, and the trading of 
these credits within cap-and-trade regimes promises more cost-effective pollution 
reductions than might be achieved under command-and-control regulation. In the 
context of climate change, however, the efficacy of cap-and-trade regimes in 
actually reducing carbon emissions—and the validity of some carbon credits—has 
come into serious doubt.  
On occasion, commentators have considered individual environmental myths 
and proposed explanations for their existence.1 But to date there has been no 
systematic analysis of these myths or their implications. This Article explores 
several prominent myths of environmental law and their possible functions. In 
addition to the more obvious political reasons for the persistence of these myths, 
these myths often serve important expressive functions. Furthermore, though the 
term myth often has a negative connotation, it is important to remember that the laws 
in which environmental myths are embedded have dramatically reduced pollution, 
improved environmental quality, and protected valued resources. This Article thus 
considers the potential value of myth and suggests reforms to bring about a more 
effective and forthright system of environmental law.  
Part II introduces six prominent myths of environmental law that arise in a 
variety of contexts. Part III considers the inaccuracies or failures that generate these 
myths. The myths of environmental law may involve shortcomings in implementing 
the law as well as conceptual flaws in the law itself. Part IV looks to sociology and 
anthropology for insights into the roles of myths more generally. Myths are not 
merely a form of primitive science, but perform important functions even in 
contemporary, complex societies. Part V applies the insights from the study of myths 
to the myths of environmental law. The analysis in this part reveals that 
environmental law’s myths, like classical myths, explain complexities of the world 
around us, express social values, and legitimize legal arrangements and economic 
systems. Finally, Part VI considers implications for designing and implementing 
environmental law going forward. 
  
1 See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Myth: Evaluating 
Long-Term Environmental Settlements, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 567, 573–75 (1995).  
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II.  SIX PROMINENT MYTHS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
This Part introduces six areas of environmental law in which myths play a 
prominent role: wetlands mitigation schemes, pollution credit trading programs, risk 
assessment, legal standards that purport to regulate without regard to cost, regulatory 
programs that focus on industrial pollution sources, and sustainable development. 
The widespread presence of myths in environmental law suggests that their 
occurrence is not merely accidental and merits closer examination. 
 
A.  Wetlands Mitigation 
 
Environmental mitigation refers to efforts to compensate for the negative 
effects human activities have on the environment. Mitigation programs may address 
the loss of specific environmental amenities, such as open space or habitat,2 or the 
general environmental effects of a proposed project.3 Such programs may require 
project proponents to undertake compensatory measures directly or to pay fees to 
support such measures. 
Wetlands mitigation provides a leading example of such programs. Wetlands 
perform important ecological functions, including moderating floods, filtering 
wastes, and providing habitat for numerous species.4 Federal wetlands protection 
occurs primarily through the Clean Water Act (CWA), which requires a property 
owner to obtain a Section 404 permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(Corps) prior to “the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters 
at specified disposal sites.”5 The Corps may not issue a permit “if there is a 
2 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (2012) (authorizing issuance of incidental take permits 
under the Endangered Species Act where applicants have prepared a habitat conservation 
plan specifying steps to minimize and mitigate impacts on protected species); Fred 
Bosselman, Swamp Swaps: The “Second Nature” of Wetlands, 39 ENVTL. L. 577, 591–92 
(2009) (discussing species conservation banks); David C. Levy & Jessica Owley Lippmann, 
Preservation as Mitigation Under CEQA: Ho Hum or Uh-Oh?, ENVTL. L. NEWS, Summer 
2005, at 18, 18–19 (discussing the two most common forms of mitigation). 
3 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (requiring 
mitigation under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)). While the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not contain a substantive mitigation requirement 
equivalent to that found in CEQA, a federal agency may avoid having to prepare a full-blown 
environmental impact statement if it adopts mitigation measures sufficient to avoid 
significant effects, referred to as a “mitigated FONSI.” See Final Guidance for Federal 
Departments and Agencies on the Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring and 
Clarifying the Appropriate Use of Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg. 
3843, 3848 (Jan. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500–02, 1505–08). 
4 HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND 
READINGS 381–82 (6th ed. 2012); Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of 
Trading Ecosystem Services: A Case Study of Wetland and Stream Compensatory Mitigation 
Markets, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 229, 238–45 (2012). 
5 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). 
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practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse 
impact on the aquatic ecosystem.”6 Furthermore, the proposed discharge may not 
“cause or contribute to significant degradation of the waters of the United States,”7 
and the applicant must take “appropriate and practicable steps . . . [to] minimize 
potential adverse impacts of the discharge on the aquatic ecosystem.”8 Finally, the 
applicant must compensate for those impacts that remain by replacing or providing 
substitute wetland habitat.9 Together, these requirements constitute a “mitigation 
sequence” for permit applicants to follow: avoidance of impacts, minimization of 
unavoidable impacts, and compensation.10  
Since 1989, the United States has maintained a goal of “no net loss” of wetlands 
acreage and function.11 If a proposed action will have unavoidable adverse impacts 
on aquatic resources, the government requires compensatory mitigation to ensure 
the no net loss goal is met.12 Although the mitigation sequence prioritizes avoidance 
and minimization of adverse impacts over compensatory mitigation, landowners 
frequently opt for compensatory mitigation first.13 Such mitigation may involve 
restoring a previously existing wetland, enhancing an existing wetland’s functions, 
preserving an existing wetland, or creating a new wetland.14 A permittee may fulfill 
its mitigation responsibilities by conducting the mitigation itself or by contributing 
toward offsite mitigation through a mitigation bank or in-lieu fee mitigation 
program.15 
Unfortunately, compensatory mitigation has failed to achieve the no net loss 
objective. A 2001 study by the National Research Council (NRC) concluded as 
much, notwithstanding the fact that the wetlands permits on paper required 1.8 acres 
6 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2013). 
7 Id. § 230.10(c). 
8 Id. § 230.10(d). 
9 See id. § 230.75(d). 
10 Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act: Where It Comes From, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15, 
18–19 (2009); Memorandum of Agreement Between the Dep’t of the Army and the Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, The Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) 
Guidelines (Feb. 6, 1990), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/ 
wetlands/mitigate.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/S7K-9S6H. Even if these requirements 
are met, the Corps may deny a permit if the proposed activity is contrary to the public interest, 
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2014), and the EPA may veto a Corps-issued permit for activities 
having unacceptable adverse effects on the environment, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012). The 
practice of mitigation grew out of these agencies’ respective unwillingness to exercise their 
authority to deny or veto permits. See Hough & Robertson, supra at 17. 
11 DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 4, at 382. 
12 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 
19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
13 See Bonnie Malloy, Symbolic Gestures or Our Saving Grace: The Relevance of 
Compensatory Mitigation for Florida’s Wetlands in the Climate Change Era, 27 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 103, 117 (2011); Bosselman, supra note 2, at 582–83. 
14 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. at 19,594. 
15 Id. at 19,594–95. 
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to be mitigated for every acre lost.16 Factors contributing to this failure include 
unclear standards, standards that focus on easily measured parameters rather than 
overall viability, and inadequate implementation and enforcement.17 For example, 
more readily constructed open-water areas are often used to compensate for the loss 
of saturated or intermittently inundated wetlands, even though each of these wetland 
types tends to contain different species and perform different ecological functions.18 
Summarizing the results of earlier studies, the NRC concluded that only “[b]etween 
70% and 76% of the mitigation required in the permits is implemented, . . . about 
50% to 53% of the implemented mitigation projects did not meet the permit 
requirements[, and] the estimate of functional equivalency of mitigation wetland 
was about 20% of that intended.”19 
The federal government responded to the NRC study by issuing new 
regulations adopting many of the study’s recommendations.20 Mitigation is to be 
“based on what is practicable and capable of compensating for the aquatic resource 
functions that will be lost as a result of the permitted activity,”21 and mitigation plans 
must contain ecologically based performance standards.22 The new rules also 
establish a preference for the use of mitigation banks, as opposed to in-lieu fee 
programs or permittee-responsible mitigation. Mitigation banks are offsite 
conservation areas designed to replace destroyed wetland resources; because their 
establishment typically occurs prior to wetlands destruction, they are considered to 
be less environmentally risky.23 Moreover, they enable the consolidation of 
resources, expertise, and monitoring efforts in connection with large, ecologically 
valuable parcels.24  
One commentator nonetheless has criticized the new rules for allowing “far too 
much discretion . . . to allow mitigation to occur” instead of avoidance or 
16 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT 2–3 (2001). 
17 See id. at 95–108. 
18 See id. at 106. 
19 Id. at 120; see also Royal C. Gardner et al., Compensating for Wetland Losses Under 
the Clean Water Act (Redux): Evaluating the Federal Compensatory Mitigation Regulation, 
38 STETSON L. REV. 213, 219 nn.35–40 (2009) (citing studies exploring various mitigation 
methods). 
20 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. at 19,594; 
see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, 
§ 314(b), 117 Stat. 1392, 1431 (2003) (mandating issuance of these regulations).  
21 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(a)(1) (2013). 
22 Id. § 332.5(a). 
23 See Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46 
AKRON L. REV. 1091, 1108–10 (2013). 
24 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(a)(1); Owley, supra note 23, at 1110. Empirical data, however, 
suggests that mitigation banks may not be more effective than mitigation performed by 
permittees. See Rebecca L. Kihslinger, Success of Wetland Mitigation Projects, NAT’L 
WETLANDS NEWSL., Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 14, 15. 
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minimization.25 Further, the rules arguably “include[] too few safeguards to ensure 
that mitigation serves to successfully compensate for lost functions and values of 
impacted waters.”26 For example, the rules allow preservation of wetlands other than 
the ones under permit to serve as compensatory mitigation where, among other 
conditions, the resources to be preserved have important ecological functions.27 
Preservation of valuable wetlands can be a critical objective. However, by definition, 
preservation creates no new resources to compensate for destroyed wetlands.28 Nor 
does it even enhance or restore existing resources.29 Accepting preservation as a 
form of mitigation thus runs counter to the basic principle that mitigation should 
compensate for destroyed or damaged resources. Finally, although the full effects of 
the new rules remain to be seen, the Corps’ past reluctance to deny permit 
applications30 also warrants concern because it foreshadows a continuing failure to 
apply and enforce standards designed to protect the environment. 
In many instances, mitigation does not truly compensate for ecological harm. 
Wetlands mitigation schemes assume that wetlands are fungible, yet ecological 
complexity calls into question this assumption. In addition, to the extent these 
schemes accept preservation as a form of mitigation, they require no compensation 
at all. Ultimately, the shortcomings of wetlands mitigation programs make it 
unlikely that the no net loss goal will be achieved. 
 
B.  Pollution Credit Trading Programs 
 
Pollution credit trading programs rest on an assumption similar to that 
underlying wetlands mitigation: pollution emissions are fungible. Although this 
25 James Murphy et al., New Mitigation Rule Promises More of the Same: Why the New 
Corps and EPA Mitigation Rule Will Fail to Protect Our Aquatic Resources Adequately, 38 
STETSON L. REV. 311, 313 (2009). 
26 Id. 
27 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(h). Among these conditions are requirements that the preserved 
resources be “under threat of destruction or adverse modifications” and that the preserved 
site “be permanently protected.” Id. § 332.3(h)(1)(iv)–(v). 
28 See Murphy et al., supra note 25, at 332–33; see also Levy & Lippmann, supra note 
2, at 19 (criticizing preservation as a form of mitigation because preservation “admits that 
destruction of the amenity will occur,” “results in an overall net loss in the amenity,” and 
only “seeks to prevent future harm”). The use of preservation as a form of mitigation under 
CEQA illustrates a similar dynamic. Under CEQA, projects requiring agency approval must 
incorporate feasible mitigation measures. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 2007 & Supp. 
2014); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15092, 15096(h) (2014). CEQA’s implementing 
regulations define mitigation to include the preservation of offsite resources. Id. § 15370. 
Preservation is a commonly used method to meet CEQA mitigation requirements, 
notwithstanding the fact that preservation does not actually mitigate the present harms of a 
proposed project. See Levy & Lippmann, supra note 2, at 20.  
29 See Murphy et al., supra note 25, at 332. 
30 See Malloy, supra note 13, at 119–20 (noting that over 12,000 permits were issued 
and only one permit was denied between 1999 and 2003); Hough & Robertson, supra note 
10, at 27 (reporting a 0.25% denial rate in 2004 and 2005). 
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assumption may be less problematic than in the wetlands context, these programs 
nevertheless are subject to controversy. 
In the last two decades, cap-and-trade programs have become an increasingly 
popular mechanism for regulating air pollution.31 The key selling point behind cap-
and-trade schemes is the promise to yield pollution reductions more cost effectively 
than conventional command-and-control regulation. Cap-and-trade programs 
require sources of pollution to possess pollution allowances in a quantity equivalent 
to the amount of pollution they emit. A program caps the total quantity of 
allowances, and program administrators distribute allowances to pollution sources 
either for free or via auction. A source may then purchase or sell allowances, and its 
decisions will depend on a comparison of allowance prices with the source’s cost of 
reducing emissions directly.  
Cap-and-trade programs frequently allow pollution sources to satisfy program 
requirements by using offsets in lieu of allowances.32 Offsets are typically generated 
when sources outside the cap-and-trade program reduce their pollution.33 Once these 
reductions are verified, the sources receive offset credits that may be used or sold 
like allowances.34  
Emission trading programs pose substantial challenges for enforcement: 
program effectiveness hinges on accurate emissions data, which is often difficult if 
not impossible to come by.35 To make matters worse, the financial gains made 
possible by allowance trading create incentives for fraud.36 These challenges expand 
when pollution sources are allowed to use offsets to satisfy program requirements.37 
The inclusion of offsets complicates the already demanding tasks of monitoring and 
verification because offsets originate from sources whose emissions tend to be 
especially difficult and costly to measure. Sources of offsets may include, for 
example, small-scale polluters not subject to emissions monitoring, as well as 
forestry, ranching, and other land-use activities whose emissions are not readily 
quantified.38 They also may include sources located outside the jurisdiction of the 
agency that oversees the emissions trading program.39 Unfortunately, offset 
31 See Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving 
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 396 (2009). 
32 Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-and-Trade Regulation, 40 
ENVTL. L. 1195, 1216 (2010). 
33 Id. Offsets may also be generated by projects that sequester pollution. See id. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 1197–1216. 
36 Id. at 1200–02. 
37 Id. at 1216–17. 
38 Id.; see, e.g., Compliance Offset Program, AIR RESOURCES BOARD, 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/V9 
E3-X7LE (last visited Aug. 27, 2014) (describing California’s adoption of carbon offset 
protocols governing forest and livestock projects, and elimination of ozone depleting 
substances). 
39 David M. Driesen, Linkage and Multilevel Governance, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 389, 402–03 (2009). Cap-and-trade programs have also been plagued by a tendency to 
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programs can even undermine pollution reduction goals by “encourag[ing] project 
hosts to gain credit when net emissions happen to be declining (whether or not they 
are actually declining due to some additional effort) but leav[ing] the source 
unregulated when net emissions are rising.”40 
Notwithstanding these concerns, cap-and-trade programs addressing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been adopted internationally (under the 
Kyoto Protocol), regionally (within the European Union), nationally (e.g., by 
Norway),41 and subnationally (e.g., by California in its implementation of AB 32).42 
The stated appeal of these schemes is their ability to generate cost-effective 
emissions reductions. The extent to which these programs have actually reduced 
carbon emissions is open to debate, however. Indeed, their continued use despite 
accompanying doubts suggests that their appeal derives from appearing to tackle the 
problem while avoiding more onerous, systemic changes that might be necessary. 
The Kyoto Protocol presents perhaps the most prominent example of the 
difficulties faced by carbon trading schemes. Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
industrialized nations—but not developing countries—committed to reduce their 
GHG emissions during a five-year commitment period (2008–2012) by 
approximately five percent from 1990 emission levels.43 On paper, the agreement 
pushed nations primarily to reduce emissions themselves by requiring that any 
emissions trading be “supplemental to domestic actions.”44 However, the Protocol 
contained several “flexibility mechanisms” designed to ease compliance, including 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading. These 
mechanisms have proven critical to fulfilling industrialized nations’ commitments.  
The offset system created by the CDM has had especially troubling effects. The 
CDM was intended to foster sustainable development in developing countries while 
reducing industrialized countries’ compliance costs.45 Under the CDM, 
industrialized nations may obtain carbon credits (“certified emission reductions”) 
for funding activities in developing countries that reduce GHG emissions.46 These 
credits essentially substitute carbon-reducing projects in developing countries for 
over-allocate allowances, a problem that can defeat the purpose of these programs. 
McAllister, supra note 31, at 410–11. 
40 Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon 
Offsets 15 (Program on Energy & Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 74, 2008).  
41 Judson Jaffe et al., Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging 
International Climate Policy Architecture, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 789, 793 (2009) (noting that 
Norway operated its own emissions trading system before joining the European Union 
Emission Trading System in 2008). 
42 See Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental Leadership: 
California’s Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 70–75 (2013). 
43 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
art. 3.1 & Annex B, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
44 Id. art. 16 bis.  
45 Id. art. 12.2. 
46 Id. art. 12.3. 
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commitments to reduce existing emissions in industrialized nations.47 Ensuring that 
CDM projects actually produce a net reduction in emissions is essential to the 
integrity of the system, especially as the Kyoto Protocol placed no limit on the 
number of carbon credits that may be generated through the CDM.48  
As an example of a CDM project, investment in switching a coal-fueled power 
plant in China to natural gas would generate certified credits if it can be shown that 
the project reduces emissions. These reductions must be real and additional to what 
would have happened in the absence of such investment. However, determining 
whether an activity and any associated emissions reductions are real and additional 
is controversial and problematic.49 In the power plant example, it may be impossible 
to determine whether the switch to natural gas would have occurred in the absence 
of the CDM. Such a determination requires a hypothetical inquiry that has proven to 
be extremely susceptible to manipulation. Host governments, project investors, and 
third-party verifiers, on which the system relies, all face incentives—whether in 
gathering data, analyzing information, or certifying projects—that favor project 
approval.50 
Indeed, implementation of the CDM has increased net GHG emissions in some 
instances. Most notoriously, the easy availability of carbon credits prompted 
manufacturers of coolant gases (which happen to be powerful GHGs) to 
dramatically increase coolant production for the sole purpose of destroying waste 
gases (which are even more powerful GHGs), thereby generating carbon credits.51 
47 Gernot Klepper, The Future of the European Emission Trading System and the Clean 
Development Mechanism in a Post-Kyoto World, 33 ENERGY ECON. 687, 696 (2011). 
48 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 43, at art. 12; David Campbell et al., After Cancun: 
The Impossibility of Carbon Trading, 29 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 163, 171 (2010). 
49 Lambert Schneider, Assessing the Additionality of CDM Projects: Practical 
Experiences and Lessons Learned, 9 CLIMATE POL’Y 242, 243–47, 250 (2009); Wara & 
Victor, supra note 40, at 8 (“At root, the CDM and other offset schemes are unable to 
determine reliably whether credits are issued for activities that would have happened anyway 
while also keeping transaction costs under control and assuring investor certainty.”). 
50 Wara & Victor, supra note 40, at 11. The problems encountered in ensuring the 
additionality and legitimacy of offsets are not limited to the CDM. The offset portion of 
California’s carbon cap-and-trade program has prompted similar concerns. See Alan Ramo, 
The California Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses?, 20 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 109, 123–29 (2014). 
51 Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew W. Lehren, Profits on Carbon Credits Drive Output 
of a Harmful Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/world/asia/incentive-to-slow-climate-change-drives-
output-of-harmful-gases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/3UPM-
4UZK; Campbell et al., supra note 48, at 179–81 (noting that the majority of credits 
generated under the CDM have involved destruction of HFC23, a by-product of refrigerant 
production with an extremely high global warming potential—and a correspondingly high 
value for purposes of generating emission credits); see also Barry D. Solomon & Michael K. 
Heiman, Integrity of the Emerging Global Markets in Greenhouse Gases, 100 ANNALS 
ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 973, 978 (2010) (discussing problems encountered in verifying 
and certifying emission reductions under the CDM). 
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These operations are responsible for nearly half of all credits awarded under the 
CDM, and efforts to rein them in have been stymied by concerns that manufacturers 
will release the waste gases directly into the atmosphere if they are not paid to 
destroy them.52  
Another flexibility mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, emissions trading, has 
likewise undermined emissions reduction efforts. In particular, the shrinking of the 
economies in the former Soviet Republics and Eastern Europe left these nations with 
numerous excess allowances to sell, sometimes referred to as “hot air” allowances.53 
Although some countries have shunned the use of these hot air allowances to meet 
their Kyoto obligations, other nations have relied on them to avoid drastic cuts of 
their own.54 Indeed, so many of these allowances were left over after the original 
Kyoto commitment period that they became the subject of contentious 
negotiations.55 Although the developed countries collectively met their pledged 
Kyoto reductions, their emissions were not much lower than they would have been 
in the absence of Kyoto, thanks to emissions trading and the global economic 
downturn.56 
Carbon trading programs ultimately rest on two key assumptions: that 
emissions are fungible and that calculated emissions reductions represent actual 
emissions reductions. The first assumption—that emissions are fungible—is 
relatively unproblematic. In contrast to wetlands, whose value and function depend 
on their location and unique characteristics, the effects of carbon emissions are 
52 See Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 51. 
53 See Elizabeth Lokey Aldrich & Cassandra L. Koerner, Unveiling Assigned Amount 
Unit (AAU) Trades: Current Market Impacts and Prospects for the Future, 3 ATMOSPHERE 
229, 231 (2012). Each party subject to binding emission limits under the Kyoto Protocol is 
issued one Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) for each metric ton of carbon dioxide it is allowed 
to emit. See id. at 229–30. 
54 Aldrich & Koerner, supra note 53, at 232–34; Quirin Schiermeier, Hot Air, 491 
NATURE 656, 656–57 (2012). The Kyoto Protocol did not place any limit on the trading of 
AAUs other than to insist that emissions trading be a supplemental means for parties to meet 
their emission limits. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 43, at art. 16 bis. In contrast, the European 
Union has placed limits on members’ abilities to rely on offsets from the CDM and another 
of Kyoto’s project mechanisms, Joint Implementation. On average, parties can meet up to 
13.5% of their allocations by surrendering credits from these programs. Raphael Trotignon, 
Combining Cap-and-Trade with Offsets: Lessons from CER Use in the EU ETS in 2008 and 
2009, at 5 (Climate Econ. Chair Publ’ns, Working Paper Series No. 2011-03, 2011), 
available at http://www.chaireeconomieduclimat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/11-01-
19-Trotignon-Use-of-Offsets-in-the-EU-ETS-CEC1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TSG3-
8VNP; Matthew Ranson & Robert N. Stavins, Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture 
Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 403, 416, 437 (2013). 
55 See, e.g., Barbara Lewis, EU Environment Ministers Clash Over ‘Hot Air,’ REUTERS 
(Oct. 25, 2012, 5:34 PM), http://www.trust.org/item/20121025173400-
nhe7g/?source=search, archived at http://perma.cc/887E-RAHM. 
56 Aldrich & Koerner, supra note 53, at 231, 239; Schiermeier, supra note 54, at 657. 
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independent of their locale.57 However, the second assumption—that calculated 
emissions reductions represent actual emissions reductions—is tenuous, particularly 
when it comes to offsets. Additionality is essential to ensuring that actual net 
reductions in pollution occur, yet has proven almost impossible to ensure. Moreover, 
hot air allowances and other accounting maneuvers call into question the sincerity 
of the international community in addressing climate change. 
Generally speaking, pollution trading systems and other market-based 
mechanisms tap into fundamental beliefs regarding private property rights, 
utilitarianism, and virtues of the free market.58 These beliefs do not constitute myths 
themselves so much as a system of values—values that are contested not only within 
environmental policy circles but also in society more broadly. But just as classical 
myths reflected and reinforced societal values in ancient societies, the mythology of 
pollution trading systems likewise bolsters market-oriented values today. 
 
C.  Risk Assessment 
 
In systematizing the exchange of wetlands and pollution credits, mitigation and 
pollution trading schemes attempt to quantify phenomena that may not be readily 
subject to quantification. Such quantification reaches an extreme in risk assessment, 
the process of characterizing the probability and magnitude of potential harms from 
an event or occurrence.59 Chemical risk assessment, for example, identifies potential 
hazards, estimates the probability and magnitude of injury at different exposure 
levels, and analyzes the likelihood of exposure.60 The risk assessment process 
ultimately generates a risk characterization, which ideally includes a range of 
estimates to quantify identified hazards. Policymakers use the information generated 
by risk assessments to make risk management decisions ranging from inaction or 
further study to regulation or prohibition. 61 
Risk assessment is at the heart of many environmental statutes and regulatory 
actions. For example, risk assessment plays an important role in the setting of air 
pollution standards by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which 
examines whether pollutants endanger the public health or cause adverse effects on 
public welfare.62 Risk assessment is also central to the regulation of toxic substances 
57 In some circumstances, however, co-pollutants that are emitted along with carbon 
can have locally concentrated effects. See Ramo, supra note 50, at 130–32. 
58 Harro van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, Stretching Too Far? Developing Countries and 
the Role of Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 337–38 (2009); 
Todd B. Adams, Is There a Legal Future for Sustainable Development in Global Warming? 
Justice, Economics, and Protecting the Environment, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 77, 113 
(2003). 
59 See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 4, at 414, 417–20. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 421. 
62 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012) (authorizing the EPA to set National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards); id. § 7521 (authorizing the EPA to regulate air pollutants from new 
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines). 
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under the Toxic Substances Control Act, which authorizes regulation of chemical 
substances where “there is a reasonable basis to conclude that . . . [they] present[] or 
will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”63 And risk 
assessment is integral to the projection and analysis of environmental impacts under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other statutes that mandate 
environmental assessments.64 
A consideration of the chemical risk assessment process illustrates the 
substantial uncertainty risk assessments often involve. Key uncertainties in chemical 
risk assessments surround the shape of the dose-response curve, generalizability of 
results from animal and in vitro studies to humans, extrapolation from high levels of 
exposure studied in controlled experiments to lower levels more typically 
encountered outside the lab, variations in individual susceptibility, and effects of 
exposure to complex chemical mixtures.65 The undisputed uncertainty that pervades 
chemical risk assessments undermines the value of the data such assessments 
generate. Recognizing and communicating these uncertainties to decision makers 
and the public is thus critical to informed policymaking.66  
Unfortunately, however, such uncertainties often receive little attention in the 
policymaking process. The quantitative analyses typically generated by risk 
assessments tend to hinder the consideration of qualitative factors and other 
pertinent concerns less amenable to quantification.67 Even worse, because regulatory 
statutes often require a degree of certainty as a precondition to regulate, the mere 
presence of uncertainty regarding harm provides a powerful lever for industry to 
argue against regulation.68 Under the law, lack of evidence of risk is typically treated 
as evidence of lack of risk.69 
Risk assessments depend on a central assumption: that the study and 
quantification of hazards can capture relevant risks with reasonable accuracy. Risk 
63 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2012). 
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (outlining the NEPA requirement that federal agencies 
prepare an environmental impact statement); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 
2014) (setting out the environmental impact analysis requirements of the CEQA). 
65 INST. OF MED., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY 52–56 
(2013). 
66 Id. at 181; David Kriebel, How Much Evidence Is Enough? Conventions of Causal 
Inference, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 133–35 (2009). 
67 See ULRICH BECK, THE RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 71 (Mark 
Ritter trans., 1992) (criticizing assumption of scientific rationality “that so long as risks are 
not recognized scientifically, they do not exist—at least not legally, medically, 
technologically, or socially, and they are thus not prevented, treated or compensated for”); 
SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 265 (2005) (“In the United States, a preferred method for displaying 
objectivity in public decisions has been to clothe the reasons for allocative choices as far as 
possible in the language of numbers.”). 
68 Kriebel, supra note 66, at 123; see Alyson C. Flournoy, Coping with Complexity, 27 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 809, 819–20 (1994). 
69 See Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in 
Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 366 (1991). 
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assessments are mythical in that they offer a sense of control, certainty, and 
objectivity in situations of ignorance, doubt, and subjective judgment. Thanks to the 
numerous sources of uncertainty and subjectivity involved in the assessment 
process, one critic goes so far as to assert that risk assessments “generate[] numbers 
that are meaningless” and “anything but scientific, objective, and credible.”70 “The 
unreliability of risk assessment is an open secret. . . . This open secret about risk 
assessment has not, however, reached the administrative agencies or the courts, 
which continue to speak in precise terms about the number of lives purportedly 
‘saved’ by various regulations.”71 In other words, although risk assessments do not 
fully or accurately describe the environmental hazards around us, we—society and 
its institutions—act as if they do. 
 
D.  Regulation Without Regard to Costs 
 
While almost all environmental statutes are in some way concerned with risk, 
the standards in some statutes purport to focus solely on risk regardless of economic 
costs. Section 109 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), for example, instructs the EPA to 
set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) at a level that “protect[s] the 
public health” with “an adequate margin of safety.”72 Similarly, Section 7 of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) commands federal agencies to “insure that any 
action authorized, funded, or carried out” by them does not jeopardize the continued 
existence of any protected species or adversely modify such species’ critical 
habitat.73 Neither of these provisions explicitly mentions costs.74 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted both provisions to preclude agencies from taking 
costs into account. As to CAA Section 109, the Court declared in Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.,75 that it is “fairly clear that [the text of the statute] 
70 Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 413–14 (1995). 
71 Id. at 414. 
72 Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). Prior to the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, Section 112 of the Act similarly required the EPA to regulate hazardous air 
pollutants without regard to cost. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 
17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 237 (1990). 
73 Endangered Species Act § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
74 There are other statutory provisions that purport to regulate without regard to cost. 
Section 101 of the Clean Water Act establishes a “national goal that the discharge of 
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.” Clean Water Act § 101, 33 
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2012). But cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory 
Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 340 & n.105 (2006) (describing this language as “a 
societal aspiration,” suggesting that the statute does not quite mean what it says (emphasis 
omitted)). In addition, the Delaney Clause in the Food and Drug Act prohibits food and color 
additives that are found to be carcinogenic. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 379e(b)(5)(B) 
(2012); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1613, 1668 n.201 (1995).  
75 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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does not permit the EPA to consider costs in setting the standards.”76 And as to ESA 
Section 7, the Court found in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill77 that the statute 
“admits of no exception,” in accord with Congress’ intent “to halt and reverse the 
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”78 
None of this is to say that costs are irrelevant to the implementation of these 
statutes, however. A careful examination of NAAQS implementation under the 
CAA, for example, reveals a significant role for costs.79 The CAA holds states 
responsible for achieving the NAAQS by adopting and carrying out state 
implementation plans.80 States may consider claims of infeasibility, as well as costs, 
in the course of developing those plans.81  
Furthermore, notwithstanding the text of Section 109, it is virtually inevitable 
that the EPA incorporate cost considerations in the course of developing, setting, 
and revising NAAQS82—though the agency emphatically denies doing so.83 The 
76 Id. at 465. 
77 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
78 Id. at 173, 184. The ESA does authorize the government to consider costs in the 
designation of critical habitats. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). And a post-Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill amendment to the ESA establishes a procedure for granting exemptions 
from the requirements of Section 7(a)(2). See id. § 1536(h). 
79 A similar analysis could be undertaken with respect to Section 7 of the ESA. Federal 
wildlife agencies have implemented Section 7 in such a way as to avoid many of the 
potentially drastic implications of a truly cost-blind approach. For one, the agencies have 
interpreted the mandate to avoid adverse modification of critical habitat as redundant with 
the mandate to avoid jeopardy. Daniel J. Rohlf, Jeopardy Under the Endangered Species 
Act: Playing a Game Protected Species Can’t Win, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 114, 118 (2001). In 
addition, for many species, these agencies have made no critical habitat designation at all. 
Id. at 117. Furthermore, the rarity of jeopardy findings suggests the wildlife agencies are 
reluctant to act on the basis of biological data alone. See id. at 115. 
80 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012). 
81 Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 470–71; see David M. Driesen, Should Congress Direct 
the EPA to Allow Serious Harms to Public Health to Continue?: Cost-Benefit Tests and 
NAAQS Under the Clean Air Act, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 219 (1998) (distinguishing 
between consideration of cost when defining “clean air” from consideration of costs when 
determining how to reach the NAAQS, and suggesting that the CAA permits the latter, not 
the former). 
82 Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in 
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1341 n.372 (2004) (listing a multitude of 
sources that reach this conclusion). 
83 See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 3086, 3089 (Jan. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50–53, 58) (explaining that 
the EPA conducted a regulatory impact analysis to provide information on potential costs 
and benefits of alternative standards, but affirming “the EPA may not consider the costs of 
implementing the standards”); Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1269–73 
(recounting EPA statements justifying NAAQS revisions in terms of scientific evidence 
alone); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
303, 317 n.51 (1999) (“[The] EPA’s failure to require more stringent regulation of 
particulates provides some evidence of cost consideration.”). 
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EPA has at least two avenues to consider costs. First, the CAA requires the EPA to 
set NAAQS only for criteria pollutants—pollutants that the agency has identified as 
“caus[ing] or contribut[ing] to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare” and “the presence of which in the ambient air 
results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources.”84 Although this 
language does not reference costs, it gives the EPA broad discretion to determine 
what substances qualify as criteria pollutants in the first instance.85 The fact that the 
EPA has not identified any new criteria pollutants since 1976—when it added lead 
to the criteria pollutant list in response to a court order86—suggests the EPA is 
reluctant to act because of the costs that listing a new pollutant might impose.87 
Second, the EPA has repeatedly rejected the option of setting a zero-level standard 
for criteria pollutants, notwithstanding the widespread view that many criteria 
pollutants have no threshold for safe exposure.88 Indeed, the House Report on the 
1977 CAA Amendments recognized as much, admitting that it is a “necessary myth” 
that such pollutants have a safe threshold for exposure.89 Thus, at least at the 
margins, cost considerations and political realities have precluded the EPA from 
identifying criteria pollutants and selecting standards that would impose excessive 
84 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
85 Irma S. Russell, The Sustainability Principle in Sustainable Energy, 44 TULSA L. 
REV. 121, 129 (2008) (noting the EPA’s discretion to revise its list of criteria pollutants). In 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, the Second Circuit held the EPA was 
required to identify lead as a criteria pollutant. 545 F.2d 320, 324–28 (2d Cir. 1976). 
However, the EPA stipulated in that case that lead has an adverse effect on public health and 
welfare and that its presence results from numerous or diverse sources. Id. at 324.  
86 ARNOLD W. REITZE JR., STATIONARY SOURCE AIR POLLUTION LAW 42 (2005). 
87 Cf. Dwyer, supra note 72, at 277–81 (contending a statutory mandate to regulate 
based solely on health considerations retards agency standard-setting because the agency 
resists literal implementation and seeks to avoid judicial review). 
88 Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1286 (“It turns out that few, if any, criteria 
pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act exhibit a clear threshold.”); Bill Pedersen & 
David Schoenbrod, The Overwhelming Case for Clean Air Act Reform, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,969, 10,970 (noting that adverse health effects occur at all studied 
levels of exposure to fine particulates and ozone); Sunstein, supra note 83, at 317 (suggesting 
the EPA’s recognition of economic and social impacts of setting NAAQS at a very low level 
causes the EPA to reject a zero-level standard); see also David Schoenbrod, Politics and the 
Principle that Elected Legislators Should Make the Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 
270 (2003) (“The Clean Air Act is based on the assumption, although we knew at the time it 
was inaccurate, that there is a threshold” (quoting Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 
95th Cong. 8 (1977) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie))). 
89 Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1289 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 
111 (1977)). 
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economic burdens.90 The EPA’s unspoken contemplation of costs has in turn 
distorted the regulatory process and reduced its transparency.91 
The EPA’s implementation of NAAQS operates under the “fundamental fiction 
that costs do not and should not enter into the Agency’s decision making.”92 Does 
the EPA’s sub rosa incorporation of cost considerations thereby contravene Section 
109 and American Trucking? A more charitable reading of matters would be to 
interpret Section 109 as merely precluding judicial review of cost considerations in 
the NAAQS-setting process.93 The statute, in other words, grants the EPA broad 
discretion as to costs and neither requires nor prohibits their consideration by the 
EPA. “This way,” one commentator suggests, “the agency need not justify how it 
takes costs into account and so has maximum flexibility to bend with the changing 
political winds.”94 Consequently, the EPA can cloak its decisions solely in terms of 
scientific data and avoid articulating the economic, social, and other factors that are 
actually at play.95 Such an approach may be legally defensible, but it is misleading 
to those who take the statute at face value. 
The myth of regulation without regard to cost declares that safeguarding public 
health and protecting endangered species are of utmost importance, to be pursued 
whatever the cost, yet economic considerations ultimately compromise these goals. 
The perpetuation of this myth demands an explanation. One possibility proposes that 
Congress desires to make a statement on society’s behalf, a symbolic commitment 
to protecting human health.96 A more cynical account might describe the myth as a 
form of deception in which Congress and regulators fool the public into believing 
that their health and environment are receiving absolute protection based on 
90 See id. at 1290; Schoenbrod, supra note 88, at 271 (“[I]t is widely understood that 
the [EPA] does consider costs [in setting NAAQS] while maintaining an official posture of 
not doing so.”); see also Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative 
Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1365–66 (2002) 
(discussing an agency’s incentive to consider and minimize firms’ compliance costs in order 
to reduce the likelihood that the firms will challenge a regulation). 
91 Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1345–46 (asserting that “an open 
consideration of costs [in the NAAQS setting process] would not only likely ensure more 
cost-effective policy decisions, it would also better serve some of the core principles that 
undergird administrative law”); see also Dwyer, supra note 72, at 282 (contending that 
unrealistic and “symbolic legislation tends to force an agency to misrepresent its position to 
Congress, the courts, and the public”). 
92 Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1325. 
93 Johnston, supra note 90, at 1396–98. 
94 Schoenbrod, supra note 88, at 271; see also Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-
Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 221 (2004) (explaining 
Professor Sunstein’s view that statutory standards that incorporate cost-benefit balancing are 
more susceptible to legal challenges). 
95 Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1291–92; Wagner, supra note 74, at 1655–
66. 
96 See Dwyer, supra note 72, at 248–49 (discussing idealistic legislation with 
unattainable goals that “symbolizes the government’s commitment to certain public values”). 
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scientific factors alone.97 The preceding discussion suggests a further, more nuanced 
explanation: the myth shields the agency from judicial review when it exercises 
discretion to consider costs. For obvious reasons, the agency may prefer such an 
arrangement. Legislators also may find such schemes attractive because they 
encourage regulatory targets to direct their attention—and campaign contributions—
to legislators who can intervene on the targets’ behalf.98 And while regulatory targets 
might prefer standards that reference cost considerations explicitly, the myth may 
serve their interests as well by shielding them from even more stringent or more 
readily established standards.99 In the end, these parties all have a stake in promoting 
the myth of regulation without regard to cost. 
 
E.  The Sources of Environmental Problems 
 
Just as law defines environmental problems through regulatory schemes and 
risk management processes, it also defines the causes of those problems by singling 
out targets for regulation. Historically, environmental regulation has focused on 
large industrial polluters.100 For example, the CWA imposes permit and pollution 
control requirements on “point sources,” defined as “discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance[s],” like those typically found at a factory or paper mill,101 and 
largely gives a pass to other sources of pollution. The CAA allows states some 
flexibility in deciding which sources to regulate in order to achieve mandated air 
quality standards, but major provisions of the CAA impose permitting requirements 
and emissions limits solely on large industrial sources.102 
At the dawn of federal environmental regulation, industrial sources were widely 
perceived as the cause of pollution problems, and Congress concentrated on them 
accordingly.103 Several practical reasons explain the continued focus on industrial 
sources today: large polluters are generally responsible for substantial pollution, 
regulation of a few large sources rather than numerous small sources is simpler and 
97 See Wagner, supra note 74, at 1640 (discussing “intentional charade,” where “agency 
bureaucrats consciously disguise policy choices as science”); cf. Sunstein, supra note 83, at 
315 (noting political dynamic of an era when major federal environmental laws were enacted 
“in which citizens wanted air to be ‘safe’ and politicians who failed to respond were at great 
risk”). 
98 Johnston, supra note 90, at 1400–01. 
99 Cf. Wagner, supra note 74, at 1678–81 (discussing delays in promulgating science-
based standards). 
100 Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated 
Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 524–33 (2004).  
101 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012) (defining point source). 
102 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)–(b) (2012) (authorizing the EPA to establish new 
source performance standards for categories of stationary sources that contribute 
significantly to air pollution and defining stationary source as “any building, structure, 
facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant”); id. § 7475 (establishing 
preconstruction requirements for new major emitting facilities). 
103 See Vandenbergh, supra note 100, at 524, 526 (describing how Congress has 
targeted large industrial facilities to achieve its environmental goals). 
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often more cost-effective, and direct regulation of individuals may be politically 
infeasible.104 The framing of pollution as primarily an industrial problem shapes the 
policy tools lawmakers adopt in response. For instance, the CAA applies 
technology-based standards to power plants and automobiles rather than seeking to 
limit household energy consumption or individual vehicle use.105 Similarly, the 
CWA imposes technology-based standards on sewage treatment plants rather than 
attempting to restrict homeowners’ use of fertilizers or pesticides that end up in 
storm sewer systems.106 And while the emphasis on industrial sources has produced 
significant improvements in environmental quality, this somewhat narrow approach 
has overlooked opportunities to cultivate changes in practices and values in broader 
society.107 
Indeed, environmental law’s focus on industrial sources rests on a myth 
regarding the insignificance of individual patterns of behavior to environmental 
problems. Nonindustrial sources, including individuals, account for “a large and 
growing proportion of” environmental harms.108 By one estimate, individuals are 
responsible for approximately one-third of carbon emissions in the United States, a 
share larger than that of industry.109 Individuals make significant contributions to 
other environmental problems as well, including smog, mercury pollution, pesticide 
use, and petroleum releases.110 To complicate the management of such problems, 
harms caused by individuals tend to be invisible and involve multiple sources, small 
quantities, and cumulative effects.111 
Recognizing the political and practical difficulty of regulating individuals 
directly, governments and commentators have looked primarily toward economic 
incentives, information provision, and voluntary efforts as means of changing 
104 See id. at 598, 617. 
105 See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral 
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1688–89 (2007). 
106 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring publicly owned treatment works to 
adopt secondary treatment standards to further remove water pollutants). 
107 Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World: A New Relationship for Environmental 
Ethics and Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 857, 909 (2013) (“The new environmental laws [enacted in 
the 1970s] . . . did little to secure new modes of practice. Working at the scale of the industrial 
economy—power-plant emissions, fuel-efficiency standards, pre-use review of toxins, and 
ambient pollution standards—these laws made their changes invisible from the point of view 
of anyone outside the regulated industries.”); Bradley C. Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution 
Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoat Theory, 73 TEX. L. REV. 711, 
718 (1995) (“[B]ecause we deal harshly with culturally accepted symbols of environmental 
problems [such as aerosol cans, toxic waste, and large factories], it is less likely that we will 
deal with the problems (and their causes) themselves.”). 
108 Vandenbergh, supra note 100, at 534; see also JASON J. CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY 
ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, NATURE & INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 33–35 (2011); Hope M. 
Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment: Moving 
Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 120–21 (2009). 
109 Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 105, at 1694. 
110 Vandenbergh, supra note 100, at 542. 
111 Id. at 589. 
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individual environmental behavior.112 However, the existence of littering 
ordinances, recycling requirements, and other individual environmental mandates—
particularly at the local level—suggests that in some circumstances at least, direct 
regulation of individuals is administratively and politically feasible.113 Such 
regulation may become a more attractive option as new technologies facilitate the 
information gathering and enforcement efforts that individual regulation may 
require.114 
Unfortunately, environmental law’s focus on industrial sources has perpetuated 
and even strengthened the myth that individuals do not contribute significantly to 
environmental problems.115 “Polluters” are responsible for these problems, 
individuals are not.116 This distinction is further engrained through citizen suit 
provisions found in many federal environmental statutes.117 Ostensibly, the plaintiffs 
bringing these suits are acting as good citizens to defend the public from the harms 
done by industrial polluters. As individuals play an increasingly significant role in 
problems ranging from water pollution to climate change, the public’s belief that 
individuals are not at fault will hinder their solution.118  
 
F.  Sustainability 
 
Finally, the myth of environmental law that has received perhaps the closest 
scrutiny is the foundational concept of sustainability.119 Sustainability generally 
refers to the ability to maintain an activity (such as harvesting a resource) or a system 
112 Babcock, supra note 108, at 174–75 (advocating a combination of education, 
market-based incentives, and shaming to create norms of environmental responsibility); see 
generally Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging 
Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705–50 (2008) (identifying individual actions with potential 
to achieve large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions). 
113 Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors 
that Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1176–77 (2012) (“Direct regulation of 
environmentally significant individual behaviors, although less common than indirect 
regulation, occurs daily in a variety of forms in different communities, from recycling laws 
to burn limitations to vehicle inspections.”). 
114 Id. at 1121–22. Furthermore, designing mandates to avoid imposing 
disproportionate or substantial burdens and to limit their intrusion into the home can allay 
the objection that such regulation is too invasive. See id. at 1177. 
115 Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and 
Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 212–14 (2001) (contending that failure of environmental 
law to address individual sources of harm has bolstered the myth that individuals are not 
significant sources of harm). 
116 Id. at 192–93. 
117 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) (authorizing citizen suits under the Clean Water 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012) (authorizing citizen suits under the Clean Air Act). 
118 See Vandenbergh, supra note 115, at 192–93. 
119 Professor Michael Burger has described sustainability as “the most influential 
environmental idea of the last 30 years.” Michael Burger, The Story with Sustainability, 
[2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,356, 10,356. 
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over time. The concept is often expressed in terms of sustainable development, 
which the Brundtland Commission famously defined as “development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.”120 Another description notes that sustainability “integrat[es] 
environmental protection and restoration into economic, social, and national security 
decisions and goals.”121 
The sustainability concept exists throughout environmental law. The concept 
plays an especially prominent role in international law: it is an animating principle 
of the Rio Declaration,122 Agenda 21,123 and the Millennium Development Goals;124 
it is reflected in important instruments such as the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change125 and the Convention on Biological Diversity;126 and it “has 
received nearly universal acceptance,” at least rhetorically, “among every sector of 
international society.”127 Direct references to sustainability in domestic 
environmental laws can be found in resource management statutes governing the 
national forests and other multiple-use public lands.128 Other environmental statutes 
120 Rep. of the World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Our Common Future, pt. 1, ch. 2, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (1987) [hereinafter The Brundtland Report], available at 
http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/5X6P-ECDG. 
121 JOHN C. DERNBACH, ACTING AS IF TOMORROW MATTERS: ACCELERATING THE 
TRANSITION TO SUSTAINABILITY 4 (2012). 
122 See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I, princ. 1 (Aug. 12, 1992), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z2QS-ZR6U (“Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.”); 
see also id. princ. 3–5, 8. 
123 See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), 
Annex II (1993), available at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Age 
nda21.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X6PS-JFVL (emphasizing the importance of 
sustainable development). 
124 U.N. Dep’t of Public Information, We Can End Poverty: Millennium Development 
Goals and Beyond 2015: Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Goal_7_fs.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3Q6-
FPP6. 
125 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (setting out the objective of stabilizing GHG concentrations while 
“enabl[ing] economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”). 
126 See United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1, June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 143 (setting out “sustainable use” of biological diversity as one of the treaty’s 
objectives). 
127 See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
172 (4th ed. 2011). 
128 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 529 (2012) (directing the secretary of agriculture to administer 
renewable surface resources of national forests for multiple use and sustained yield); 43 
U.S.C. § 1732 (2012) (directing the secretary of the interior to manage Bureau of Land 
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that do not explicitly use the term nevertheless rest on notions of sustainability—for 
example, NEPA declares a policy of seeking “to create and maintain conditions 
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, 
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans.”129 Indeed, some commentators contend that virtually all major federal 
environmental statutes share with sustainability an assumption that “management of 
human uses of the environment lies largely within human control” and that the 
effects of human activity are generally reversible.130 
Various reasons explain the widespread appeal of sustainability and sustainable 
development. Sustainability is grounded in a fundamental truth: the Earth has a 
limited carrying capacity, and human activity threatens to exceed it.131 More 
importantly, sustainable development’s “brilliant ambiguity”132 enables different 
constituencies to read into the concept whatever they find most compelling: it is a 
“‘big tent,’ spacious enough to accommodate three usually disparate factions—
development proponents, environmental groups, and social justice advocates.”133 A 
concrete example of sustainability’s unifying force can be found in the Kyoto 
Protocol’s CDM, which simultaneously promises growth to developing countries 
and environmental salvation (as well as cost savings) to industrialized nations.134 In 
such ways, sustainable development offers to reconcile the interests of present and 
future generations and of the rich and poor, assuring us in the meanwhile that we 
can have it all.135 
Management (BLM) public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield); 
Robert L. Glicksman, Sustainable Federal Land Management: Protecting Ecological 
Integrity and Preserving Environmental Principal, 44 TULSA L. REV. 147, 156–67 (2008) 
(discussing the sustained yield mandates of the Forest Service and BLM). 
129 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012). 
130 Robin Kundis Craig & Melinda Harm Benson, Replacing Sustainability, 46 AKRON 
L. REV. 841, 848 (2013). 
131 DERNBACH, supra note 121, at 1; Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Sustainability 
Through Ethics, Economics, and Environmental Coordination, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,350, 10,351; Patrick Parenteau, It’s the Biosphere, Stupid, [2013] 43 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,347, 10,347. 
132 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 127, at 148. 
133 Alison Peck, Sustainable Development and the Reconciliation of Opposites, 57 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 151, 158 (2012); see also Charles A. S. Hall, The Myth of Sustainable 
Development: Personal Reflections on Energy, its Relation to Neoclassical Economics, and 
Stanley Jevons, 126 J. ENERGY RESOURCES TECH. 85, 86–87 (2004) (noting various 
definitions of sustainable development); J.B. Ruhl, Law for Sustainable Development: Work 
Continues on the Rubik’s Cube, 44 TULSA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2008) (observing the varied 
meanings of sustainable development). 
134 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 43, at art. 12; GRANT A. KIRKMAN ET AL., UNITED 
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, BENEFITS OF THE CLEAN 
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 2012, at 7–10 (2012), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/ 
dev_ben/about/dev_ben/ABC_2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F5XF-BU8J. 
135 Rebecca M. Bratspies, Sustainability Is the Answer—Now What Was the Question?, 
[2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,352, 10,352 (“As a marketing ploy, 
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Unfortunately, evidence of actual sustainability remains sparse. One popular 
measure of sustainability, the ecological footprint, indicates that humans are 
consuming the Earth’s resources at a rate fifty percent greater than the rate at which 
such resources are being regenerated.136 Extinction rates as well as data regarding 
land use and biomass consumption likewise suggest that sustainability remains a 
pious yet possibly unrealistic goal.137 In the two decades since the concept of 
sustainability has come to dominate international environmental law, global 
population—and per capita consumption rates—have continued to rise while the 
state of the global environment has worsened.138 The integration of truly sustainable 
development into international, national, and local policies has been limited.139 Even 
sustainability’s proponents concede the urgent need for wider and more effective 
implementation of policies to promote sustainability.140 
Against such facts, the concept of sustainability has come under attack. Over a 
decade ago, Professor William H. Rodgers, Jr., attacked “the conviction that gains 
from economic development could be enjoyed without sacrifice of the natural 
world” as “a convenient, powerful, and serviceable myth [that] . . . happens to be 
faulty at its foundations.”141 More recently, Professor David Barnhizer characterized 
sustainability as an “impossible dream” due to its “extraordinary complexity and the 
fact that it does not fit how we think and organize . . . [and] because we lack the 
sustainability encapsulates our fantasy of a sudden technological breakthrough that will 
allow 7 billion, or 10 billion, humans to live the typical American consumption-based 
lifestyle, only without destroying the earth in the process.”); Burger, supra note 119, at 
10,356 (“Sustainability promises that humanity—operating on scales from global civilization 
to local enclaves—can achieve simultaneous economic development, environmental 
protection, and social equity, a kind of holistic harmony that requires hard labor but no 
sacrifice.”). 
136 See World Footprint: Do We Fit on the Planet?, GLOBAL FOOTPRINT NETWORK, 
http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/world_footprint/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/YXT2-WF5K (last updated Mar. 28, 2014). For a summary of environmental 
trends in the United States, see DERNBACH, supra note 121, at 15–38. 
137 See Parenteau, supra note 131, at 10,347. 
138 John C. Dernbach, Navigating the U.S. Transition to Sustainability: Matching 
National Governance Challenges with Appropriate Legal Tools, 44 TULSA L. REV. 93, 95–
96 (2008). 
139 See F. Biermann et al., Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving Earth System 
Governance, 335 SCIENCE 1306, 1306 (2012) (noting that to “steer away from critical tipping 
points in the Earth system that might lead to rapid and irreversible change . . . . requires 
fundamental reorientation and restructuring of national and international institutions toward 
more effective Earth system governance and planetary stewardship”). 
140 See, e.g., DERNBACH, supra note 121, at 229–30 (“Achieving sustainability requires 
much more rapid progress than we have seen to date.”). 
141 William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Myth of the Win-Win: Misdiagnosis in the Business of 
Reassembling Nature, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 297, 297 (2000). 
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political will to implement [it].”142 Professor Douglas A. Kysar similarly observed 
that sustainability is not only too vague to guide concrete policy choices, but also 
stands in an unresolved and unacknowledged conflict with liberal market 
economics, in terms of accounting for intergenerational equity, intragenerational 
equity, and the effects of liberalized trade regimes.143 Sustainable development, in 
other words, remains rooted in the dominant and environmentally problematic 
paradigm of economic growth.144 Adoption of the concept is potentially 
counterproductive because it masks continuing harm and reinforces and perpetuates 
existing power dynamics.145 The concept of sustainability, Professors Robin Kundis 
Craig and Melinda Harm Benson argue further, is practically meaningless in the face 
of climate change because it calls for maintaining stability in a world of uncertainty 
and unavoidable change.146 Notwithstanding its optimistic promises, Professor 
Annie Rochette warns, sustainable development “fails to question the assumption 
that continuous economic growth will eventually lead to the destruction of the 
planet.”147 At best, the concept of sustainability represents an unrealistic goal; at 
worst, it further entrenches existing beliefs and practices pertaining to production 
and consumption.  
Even if unattainable, supporters of sustainability nonetheless contend that it 
may “provid[e] a powerful ideal and an aspirational goal that, if honestly adhered to 
142 David Barnhizer, Waking from Sustainability’s “Impossible Dream”: The 
Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 595, 
616 (2006). 
143 Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2117–47 (2005). 
144 William E. Rees, The Ecological Crisis and Self-Delusion: Implications for the 
Building Sector, 37 BUILDING RES. & INFO. 300, 303 (2009); see also Hall, supra note 133, 
at 89 (contending that population and economic growth necessarily “undermine[] future 
sustainability because new technologies have not in fact decreased per capita dependence 
upon finite resources”); Donald K. Anton, The “Thirty-Percent Solution” and the Future of 
International Environmental Law, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 209, 215 (2013) (lamenting 
that sustainable development represents a “misplaced faith (or wish) that continued economic 
growth and development will drive effective protection of the global environment”). 
145 See Barnhizer, supra note 142, at 616; see also Burger, supra note 119, at 10,356 
(describing the “sustainability is bad” storyline). 
146 Craig & Benson, supra note 130, at 843–44. But cf. Jessica Owley, Adaptive 
Management, Resiliency, and Why Sustainability Discussions Give Me a Headache, [2013] 
43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,348, 10,348 (“Climate change does not change our 
view of sustainability; it heightens the importance of sustainability thinking.”). Professor 
Robin Kundis Craig has advocated that the concept be replaced with the concepts of 
adaptability and resilience. Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change Means the Death of 
Sustainability, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,354, 10,355. 
147 Annie Rochette, Stop the Rape of the World: An Ecofeminist Critique of Sustainable 
Development, 51 U.N.B. L.J. 145, 162 (2002); see also Rees, supra note 144, at 304 
(“[T]oday’s global society essentially equates sustainability with maintaining growth 
through technological innovation and greater material and economic efficiency.”). 
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and pursued, could substantially improve our world.”148 More than that, 
sustainability may be a “vital and necessary” theme to motivate essential changes in 
policies and behavior.149 Towards this end, various commentators have suggested 
that sustainability be interpreted as more of a process than a goal: a sustainability 
process entails thinking about the future and taking an adaptive approach;150 more 
honestly and thoroughly pursuing economic, environmental, and equitable concerns 
into our policies;151 and replacing a focus on short-term efficiency with attention to 
systemic risk.152 
 
III.  A TYPOLOGY OF FAILURES UNDERLYING THE MYTHS 
 
In one way or another, the myths discussed in the preceding Part all involve the 
failure of environmental law to achieve its objectives and ideals. Wetlands loss 
continues in the United States, albeit at a reduced pace, notwithstanding the 
institution of a no net loss policy.153 Atmospheric GHG concentrations are still rising 
steadily despite the establishment of various cap-and-trade systems.154 People and 
the environment continue to be subjected to unregulated and unknown risks despite 
the widespread adoption of risk assessment. Regulators persist in taking costs into 
account, despite explicit instructions to the contrary. Meanwhile, individuals largely 
escape regulation, notwithstanding their significant contributions to environmental 
problems. And finally, overall human impacts on the Earth and its life-sustaining 
systems have only expanded since the introduction of the concept of sustainable 
development. Closer examination reveals two basic types of failures at work: 
failures of implementation and conceptual flaws. 
 
A.  Failures of Implementation 
 
The above-mentioned failures are in part failures of implementation resulting 
from inadequate resources, poor support, technical errors in design, and the like. In 
most instances, developing solutions to failures of implementation is conceptually 
straightforward—though not necessarily easy in practice. Providing greater 
148 Burger, supra note 119, at 10,356. 
149 Id.; see DERNBACH, supra note 121, at 11. 
150 Owley, supra note 146, at 10,348–49; see also DERNBACH, supra note 121, at 6–7 
(characterizing sustainability as both a destination and a journey). 
151 Keith H. Hirokawa, Sustainability as Process: Seeing Climate Change 
Opportunities in Sustainability Approaches, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
10,353, 10,353; Ruhl, supra note 133, at 2. 
152 David M. Driesen, What Does Sustainability Mean in the Age of Climate 
Disruption?, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,351, 10,352. 
153 T.E. DAHL, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN 
THE COTERMINOUS UNITED STATES: 2004 TO 2009, at 40–72 (2011) (finding especially 
notable losses in salt marsh and freshwater forested wetlands). 
154 See EPA, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012 at 16–19 (2d 
ed. 2012). 
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attention, manpower, and funding can address problems of inadequate resources and 
support. More careful oversight, monitoring, and enforcement can improve 
implementation. Amendments and modifications may alleviate technical errors in 
design, as the new wetlands mitigation regulations illustrate. These regulations focus 
on wetland functionality rather than acreage, and they attempt to steer compensation 
projects to locations where they will best preserve aquatic functions.155 Similarly, 
cap-and-trade regimes can be made more effective by ratcheting down pollution caps 
or closing loopholes. Each of these fixes may be politically difficult to achieve, but 
is conceptually quite simple.  
 
B.  Conceptual Flaws 
 
While problematic, failures of implementation hardly give rise to 
environmental myths by themselves. Rather, environmental myths often involve 
inherent and more intractable factors as well. For instance, an environmental myth 
may involve unavoidable imperfections in translating theory into practice. Risk 
assessment, for example, ideally would identify all hazards related to an activity and 
provide specific quantitative estimates of their magnitude and probability. This 
omniscient sort of risk assessment is impossible, of course. We can never eliminate 
uncertainty and ignorance—though our approaches to environmental risk often 
assume these phenomena away. Similarly, wetlands mitigation assumes the ability 
to identify and replicate all of a wetland’s ecological functions, despite the 
impossibility of doing so.156 
Thus, beyond the failures of implementation, environmental myths often 
involve conceptual flaws that go to the very heart of the myths. Conceptual flaws 
refer to flaws in logic or in the inferential chains that connect a policy measure with 
a desired policy outcome. Conceptual flaws make impossible the achievement of 
stated objectives, even under conditions of perfect knowledge and fully supported 
implementation. A review of the myths described above reveals conceptual flaws at 
work with respect to each.  
Take the first myth of wetlands mitigation and specifically the use of 
preservation measures as a form of mitigation. The acceptance of preservation as 
mitigation conveniently ignores the fact that preservation of resource A does nothing 
to compensate for the loss of a distinct and separate resource, resource B. The 
inevitable result of the tradeoff is a net loss of wetlands. More generally, the 
155 See generally Gardner et al., supra note 19, at 221–49 (discussing the extent to which 
the regulations reflect the NRC report recommendations); Womble & Doyle, supra note 4, 
at 258–60 (discussing watershed approach in the regulations). 
156 Under the new regulatory provisions regarding stream mitigation, engineered 
streams may serve as mitigation for the loss of existing streams, despite doubts about the 
ability of the former to carry out the functions of the latter. See Erik Stokstad, New Rules on 
Saving Wetlands Push the Limits of the Science, 320 SCIENCE 162, 162–63 (2008); 
Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,596 
(April 10, 2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325, 332) (acknowledging that the “science 
of stream restoration is still evolving and that more research is needed”). 
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wetlands mitigation program is unlikely to achieve its no net loss goal, as the very 
term “mitigation” implies that the measures being adopted only ameliorate—but do 
not fully compensate for—the harm being caused.  
With respect to the second myth, the trading of pollution credits, the acceptance 
of pollution offsets in lieu of allowances involves conceptual difficulties as well. As 
explained above, offsets—as opposed to allowances—often arise from activities 
whose pollution-reducing benefits are difficult to measure or monitor. But if these 
activities are too difficult to quantify for cap-and-trade schemes’ allowance 
requirements, it is equally difficult to justify the recognition of offsets for any 
asserted pollution reduction benefits from these sources. Unfortunately, the 
inclusion of offsets in pollution trading systems can undermine their integrity. 
The third myth, risk assessment, fosters an illusory sense of control by 
purporting to quantify phenomena that often are not quantifiable. The conceptual 
flaw in our use of risk assessment is to assume that the results of risk assessments 
fully and accurately account for the hazards that may be present. Although risk 
assessment may be the most powerful tool available to analyze health and 
environmental hazards, it has important limitations. Such limitations are often 
forgotten or ignored in the risk management process, however, when statutes 
demand quantification as a prerequisite for oversight and do little to account for 
uncertainty. 
The fourth myth, regulation without regard to costs, obscures a basic conflict 
between modern industrial society and environmental quality. On the one hand, the 
language of CAA Section 109 and other cost-disregarding statutes demands absolute 
protection of health and the environment. On the other hand, implicit in these statutes 
is a baseline understanding that our economy will continue to provide necessary 
goods and services (however one defines “necessary”).157 As much as we might 
desire otherwise, in some circumstances it may be impossible to truly protect the 
public health with “an adequate margin of safety”158 without causing severe 
economic disruption. We must then choose between the economy and the 
environment, and it is a conceptual flaw to assume we can avoid making this choice.  
The fifth myth, that individuals do not contribute significantly to environmental 
problems, ignores bare facts demonstrating that individual behavior indeed has a 
central role in many of our environmental dilemmas. Regulating industry more 
stringently, or even absolutely, simply will not solve these dilemmas without 
regulating or otherwise changing individual conduct as well.  
157 Cf. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 270 n.1 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“What this means in this case, if the allegations of Union Electric Co. prove to be correct, 
is that—in the interest of public health—the utility will be ordered to discontinue electric 
service to the public. As one cannot believe this would be allowed, I suppose that the State 
or Federal Government would find some basis for continuing to operate the company’s 
facilities to serve the public . . . .”); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 496 
(2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nor need regulation lead to deindustrialization. 
Preindustrial society was not a very healthy society; hence a standard demanding the return 
of the Stone Age would not prove ‘requisite to protect the public health.’”). 
158 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
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Finally, the myth of sustainable development is conceptually flawed in its 
inherent inability to resolve conflicts between economic development and ecological 
principles. Though more a goal than an operative legal doctrine, the myth is an 
important driver of modern environmental law, and its conceptual failures threaten 
to undermine the entire enterprise of environmental law. At its core, sustainable 
development presumes development: economic growth, increased consumption, and 
higher standards of living. Understood as such, development makes increasing 
demands on the environment and inevitably requires a sacrifice of the natural world. 
Absent a drastic reconceptualization, sustainable development cannot be sustained 
indefinitely into the future.  
In sum, the conceptual flaws present in the myths of environmental law indicate 
that, sociologically, something interesting is at work. The myths do not involve mere 
failures in implementation, but rather deliberate deception—and even self-
deception—by society. Most of these myths, moreover, concern an underlying 
tension between environmental protection and economic interests. To understand 
the functions and social significance of myths, the next Part turns to the general 
study of myths in society. 
 
IV.  ANALYZING MYTH 
 
A.  The Nature of Myth 
 
The environmental myths discussed above hardly resemble the classic stories 
that the term “myth” typically evokes. Ancient Greek and Roman myths engaged 
gods and heroes in struggles and experiences that carried significance and meaning 
beyond their literal plotlines.159 Likewise, creation myths—think Adam and Eve—
are sacred stories that express important values and beliefs, even if not taken to be 
literally true.160 In contrast, the myths of environmental law do not contain larger-
than-life protagonists, nor do they carry the social significance that classical myths 
once did or that contemporary myths still carry in more traditional societies. Thus it 
would be erroneous to analyze environmental law’s myths in precisely the same way 
as anthropologists and sociologists analyze myth.  
A closer examination of modern American law, however, reveals numerous 
fictitious or mythological elements. Accounts of its origins refer to a purely 
theoretical social contract161 and to larger-than-life Founding Fathers who not only 
159 ROBERT A. SEGAL, MYTH: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 4–6 (2004). 
160 PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 18–19 (1992). 
161 Kevin C. Mulder, Note, The Extension of Comity: Fair Assessment in Real Estate 
Association v. McNary, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1123, 1123 n.1 (1983) (noting the influence of 
political theorists, such as Locke and Rousseau, on the Framers of the Constitution); see LON 
L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 98 (1967) (“In theories of the state there appears the constantly 
recurring notion of the Social Compact, a notion which perhaps was never given full 
credence as a historical fact by anyone, but which has nevertheless had the most profound, 
and perhaps beneficial, influence on the history of human thought.”); C. B. Macpherson, 
Editor’s Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT vi, xxi (C. B. 
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are pivotal historical figures but also serve as sources of contemporary wisdom.162 
Nor are the mythological aspects of American law confined to stories of its genesis. 
Basic doctrines of tort, contract, and criminal law assume the existence of a mythical 
reasonable person and impose liability by measuring the conduct of individual 
persons against this fictional construct.163 Similarly, legal fictions of constructive 
notice and corporate personhood make presumptions that depart far from reality. 
One commentator even argues that law itself has attained a mythic status in 
contemporary society as an “autonomous” and “ideal” entity having “quasi-religious 
transcendence,” situated both apart from and within society.164 
The pervasive presence of myth in American law suggests the value of looking 
beyond the popular usage of the term “myth” merely to refer to something false or 
deceptive. Scholars commonly define myth as a story or, more broadly, as a belief 
tenaciously held by its adherents.165 Myths feature personalities—divine, human, or 
animal—that may serve as the agents or objects of actions.166 Yet myths are 
distinguishable from simple “lies” or “detached stories.”167 The narrative of the myth 
has a sacred quality, is symbolic in nature, and often contains events and objects that 
do not exist in the nonmythical world.168 Accordingly, myths tend to be 
characterized as imaginative and fictional rather than as scientific and historical.169 
At the same time, myths are not purely fictitious, as consideration of the biblical 
creation myth illustrates. Many Christians do not take the creation myth to be 
literally true.170 Nonetheless, these adherents accept the myth as containing 
important truths about the human condition.171 Ultimately, myths possess a social 
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690) (noting that Locke’s doctrine “was neatly 
and quite properly turned against the British state by the American colonists[, a]nd ever since 
. . . it has been an invaluable ideological support for the liberal constitutional state and the 
market society on which the liberal state has been built”); see generally LOCKE, supra §§ 6, 
95, 123 (focusing on the natural liberty of man and his right not to be governed without 
consent); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 9 (Charles Frankel ed., Hafner 
Publ’g Co. 1947) (1762) (“[A]ll justifiable authority among men must be established on the 
basis of conventions.”). 
162 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590–93 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (referring to intent and understanding of Founding Fathers in interpreting the 
Commerce Clause); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213–14 (1963) 
(considering the Founding Fathers’ views on religion and religious freedom in applying the 
Establishment Clause to Bible readings in public schools). 
163 See Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 511 (2005).  
164 FITZPATRICK, supra note 160, at x. 
165 See WILLIAM G. DOTY, MYTHOGRAPHY: THE STUDY OF MYTHS AND RITUALS 6–7 
(2d ed. 2000); SEGAL, supra note 159, at 4–6. 
166 SEGAL, supra note 159, at 5. 
167 MARY MIDGLEY, THE MYTHS WE LIVE BY 1 (2003). 
168 Percy S. Cohen, Theories of Myth, 4 MAN 337, 337 (1969). 
169 DOTY, supra note 165, at 7. 
170 See Roland Mushat Frye, So-Called “Creation-Science” and Mainstream Christian 
Rejections, 127 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 61, 62–63 (1983).  
171 See DOTY, supra note 165, at 19. 
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significance that ordinary stories do not; one commentator describes myth as “the 
legitimation of a social phenomenon by portraying it as natural or inevitable.”172  
Just as myths are distinguishable from mere stories, mythmaking differs from 
mere self-deception. Self-deception involves the telling of lies to oneself, and these 
lies arguably enable the more effective deception of those around us.173 To some 
degree, the myths of environmental law do involve deception of others and of self. 
The actors who make or interpret the laws at hand engage in misleading others in 
order to advance their narrow political interests, and, in some instances, those actors 
may sincerely accept the suppositions underlying the myths. The deep-rooted nature 
of these myths suggests that more than mere deception is at work here, however. 
While mythmaking may involve the telling of lies, it also incorporates “enduring 
human truths,”174 as myths are experienced “as both true and crucial to those who 
perceive through [them] their experienced world.”175 Myths are often existential in 
nature and typically concern matters of individual and social significance.176 These 
characterizations of myth arguably fit many of the myths of environmental law, as 
will be explained further below. 
Finally, myths can be distinguished not only from stories and self-deception but 
also from legal fictions. Well-known legal fictions include the personhood of 
corporations, which treats corporations for certain legal purposes as if they were real 
persons, and the attractive nuisance doctrine, which posits a fictional invitation to 
children to visit a defendant’s premises.177 “The classic common law legal fiction 
treat[s] as true a factual assertion that plainly [is] false, generally as a means to avoid 
changing a legal rule that require[s] a particular factual predicate for its 
application.”178 In contrast to a myth, a legal fiction is obviously not true, and 
everyone knows it.179 Another distinction lies in the fact that legal fictions are 
primarily the domain of courts—i.e., courts use these fictitious suppositions to 
modify or refuse to modify existing legal rules.180 By comparison, a wider range of 
actors, including legislatures, agencies, and policymakers, engage in constructing 
172 Thomas W. Joo, Narrative, Myth, and Morality in Corporate Legal Theory, 2009 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1091, 1096. 
173 ROBERT TRIVERS, THE FOLLY OF FOOLS: THE LOGIC OF DECEIT AND SELF-
DECEPTION IN HUMAN LIFE 3 (2011). 
174 DAN P. MCADAMS, THE STORIES WE LIVE BY: PERSONAL MYTHS AND THE MAKING 
OF THE SELF 11 (1993). 
175 DOTY, supra note 165, at 14 (emphasis omitted). 
176 Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1569, 1569 n.1 (2000). 
177 FULLER, supra note 161, at 12. 
178 Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1437 (2007).  
179 See FULLER, supra note 161, at 9 (defining legal fiction as “either (1) a statement 
propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement 
recognized as having utility”); Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 1, 6 (2010). 
180 See Smith, supra note 178, at 1441. But cf. Knauer, supra note 179, at 17 (noting 
use of legal fictions in statutes and regulations in addition to their use by courts). 
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and perpetuating legal myths. Notwithstanding their falsity, legal fictions remain 
useful in enabling the application of law to new or difficult circumstances.181 
Moreover, the semblance between legal fictions and legal myths suggests that the 
latter may have some utility as well, and perhaps to a broad array of interests in 
society. 
 
B.  Functions of Myth 
 
Mythography—the study of myths and their functions—can facilitate a deeper 
understanding of environmental myths, their roles, and their persistence. This 
section highlights the most pertinent of the functions of myths that scholars have 
identified. These functions include explaining natural phenomena, expressing social 
attitudes, legitimating social institutions, and promoting administrative efficiency. 
 
1.  Myth as Explanation 
 
Creation myths illustrate that myths can furnish explanations for how things 
came to be, provide interpretive frames for understanding, and offer potential 
avenues for controlling external events.182 In their explanatory and event-shaping 
role, these sorts of myths function in a manner akin to science and are sometimes 
branded as a primitive counterpart to modern science.183  
This skeptical and somewhat condescending view of myth, however, does not 
reflect the full social context in which myths exist.184 It also fails to account for the 
persistence of myth in modern, “enlightened” society.185 Rather than substituting for 
science, myth may serve as an alternative yet not exclusive means of “rationaliz[ing] 
complexity.”186 Whereas science explains through objective experimentation and 
hypothesis testing, myth “attempt[s] to express the quality and range of human 
existence, its emotional, aesthetic, and moral aspects.”187 Myth “provid[es] the 
illusion of rational intention and action[,] . . . creat[es] predictability in the face of 
random and evolutionary forces[,]”188 and fosters acceptance of uncontrollable 
181 Knauer, supra note 179, at 9, 22. 
182 See SEGAL, supra note 159, at 11–35; DOTY, supra note 165, at 132–39; MIDGLEY, 
supra note 167, at 1. 
183 See SEGAL, supra note 159, at 3. 
184 See, e.g., id. at 14–25 (discussing the views of anthropologists E.B. Tylor and J.G. 
Frazer who believe that myth is the “primitive counterpart to science” and that myth is used 
“to explain physical events”); Cohen, supra note 168, at 339 (contending that E.B. Tylor 
believed that myths were used “by primitive man to personalise the forces of the natural 
world which he seeks to understand and control” (emphasis omitted)). 
185 SEGAL, supra note 159, at 14–25. 
186 See David M. Boje et al., Myth Making: A Qualitative Step in OD Interventions, 18 
J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 17, 19–21 (1982). 
187 DOTY, supra note 165, at 93–94. 
188 Boje et al., supra note 186, at 21. 
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phenomena such as natural disasters and death.189 Viewed in this regard, science and 
myth are complementary and somewhat overlapping. Indeed, science itself may be 
viewed as a mythological system “tied to all the imagery and promise of progress,” 
and individual scientific theories as individual myths not subject to indisputable 
proof.190 
Myth’s persistence in the face of modern rationality nonetheless calls for 
further discussion. At a personal level, cognitive psychology offers one account for 
why we accept mythical explanations: uncertainty generates stress and anxiety that 
myths can ease by offering order and predictability.191 In particular, self-serving 
biases give rise to stories and myths that “inflate feelings of efficacy and control,” 
and these biases come to permeate our judgments and decisions.192 Ultimately, 
rationality does cabin our willingness to accept myth, especially when we receive 
immediate and unambiguous negative feedback to mistaken myths. But when the 
consequences of adhering to myths are uncertain, myths tend to persist.193 
Environmental problems frequently involve substantial uncertainty194 and thus 
provide fertile ground for myth to flourish. 
In recognizing the explanatory functions of myth, it should be emphasized that 
myths provide more than mere illusions of control. Myths can serve as a means of 
mediating otherwise unresolvable contradictions.195 Most pertinent to 
environmental law’s myths is that humans experience a fundamental contradiction 
between nature and culture, existing as a part of the natural world yet also standing 
outside it and seeking to control it.196 In this context, myths can enable tolerance of 
such contradictions or even appreciation of the impossibility of resolving them.197 
Furthermore, myths can provide socially valuable knowledge, “not so much the 
knowledge of the scientific laboratory as the knowledge of communal experience 
that has proved itself useful and nurturing.”198 
  
189 SEGAL, supra note 159, at 28 (discussing the views of anthropologist Bronislaw 
Malinowski). 
190 DOTY, supra note 165, at 18 (quoting JAMES ROBERTSON, AMERICAN MYTH, 
AMERICAN REALITY 280 (1980)); see also SEGAL, supra note 159, at 33–34 (discussing the 
views of philosopher Karl Popper). 
191 See Langevoort, supra note 176, at 1572–73. 
192 Id. at 1575. 
193 See id. at 1574. 
194 See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law 
in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 747 (2000). 
195 Cohen, supra note 168, at 346; SEGAL, supra note 159, at 114–15 (describing the 
views of anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss). 
196 SEGAL, supra note 159, at 114–15. 
197 See id. at 116–17. 
198 DOTY, supra note 165, at 94. 
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2.  Expressive and Legitimizing Functions of Myth 
 
Explanation is an important function of myth, but not the only one. Sociological 
theories of myth explore the social functions of myth—namely, myth’s role in 
expressing social attitudes and values, legitimating social institutions and practices, 
and creating and maintaining social solidarity.199 
Myth can have an expressive function at an individual or societal level. At an 
individual level, myths may operate in a manner akin to the making of music: 
mythmaking can be an end in itself, an emotional and creative expression of the 
individual.200 At a societal level, myths can serve as descriptive or normative 
expressions of values.201 Descriptively, myths may reflect shared values, social 
hierarchies, and other elements of the existing social order.202 Normatively, myths 
may “support[] particular types of behavior and association [while] rejecting other 
exemplary models.”203 
Perhaps the most important expressive function of myths is to legitimate 
existing social practices and institutions. This is often accomplished by connecting 
present practices with the past or with a higher order.204 Through appeals to tradition 
and long-standing practice, myths provide a justificatory explanation for social 
institutions and phenomena.205 In fulfilling such functions, myths intertwine with 
the exercise of power, as well as the struggle for power. Dominant interests may use 
myths to defend the status quo or justify self-serving actions, whereas opposing 
interests may employ myths to motivate resistance.206 The critical theory approach 
to myth emphasizes the role of mythology in legitimating social injustices.207 In this 
role, myth “presents the current world as the only possible world, papering over the 
historical struggles that simmer beneath the surface,” and “consecrates the existing 
order as common sense, thereby disabling alternatives.”208 The psychological 
tendency to expect just outcomes suggests that people are especially receptive to 
myths supporting the existing order.209 
An overlapping function of myth is the maintenance of social solidarity: myth 
serves “as social glue and a major source of cultural identity.”210 This function is 
199 See id. 
200 See Cohen, supra note 168, at 339. 
201 See DOTY, supra note 165, at 68. 
202 See id. 
203 Id. 
204 See Cohen, supra note 168, at 349; DOTY, supra note 165, at 143. 
205 See SEGAL, supra note 159, at 126–27; Joo, supra note 172, at 1098 (contending 
that myth “attempts to legitimate a social institution by obscuring the fact that the institution, 
like all social institutions, is historically contingent”). 
206 See Boje et al., supra note 186, at 19–20; SEGAL, supra note 159, at 128–29. 
207 See Litowitz, supra note 163, at 502, 507. 
208 Id. at 518. 
209 Joo, supra note 172, at 1100. 
210 Rees, supra note 144, at 303. 
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often expressed through ritual, including legal rituals such as wedding vows or 
Miranda warnings.211 Myth generally differs from ritual in that the former involves 
a statement and the latter an action.212 Nonetheless, ritual may be viewed as the 
application of myth in an effort to control external events or relieve social 
tensions.213 The content of the myth or ritual reflects social values and structures.214 
The truth of the myth or ritual, however, is less important than the belief in its 
underlying values.215 Thus, a ritual as described may differ substantially from actual 
behavior, and participants in a ritual may openly acknowledge its inefficacy in 
controlling external events.216 In hunting societies, for example, hunters often depart 
from the ritual proscriptions they claim to follow.217 In such circumstances, ritual 
represents an idealized account that “highlight[s] the incongruities between the 
actual and the ideal.”218 Modern myths, such as the “rags to riches” theme embedded 
in American culture, similarly set out ideals that reality may not reflect. Likewise, 
the ritual of giving Miranda warnings apparently does little to achieve its express 
purpose of reducing coerced confessions.219 These myths and rituals nevertheless 
affirm basic values that forge social identity and define social structure.220 
 
3.  Practical Functions of Myth 
 
Finally, myths may serve practical goals such as promoting administrability.221 
Professor Peter J. Smith offers as examples the judicial reliance on modern myths 
regarding eyewitness identifications and jury instructions.222 Notwithstanding 
empirical evidence indicating that eyewitness identifications are unreliable, judges 
routinely exclude expert testimony to that effect.223 Likewise, judges rely heavily on 
211 See Peter A. Winn, Legal Ritual, 2 LAW & CRITIQUE 207, 213–14, 230–31 (1991). 
212 See SEGAL, supra note 159, at 61, 63; DOTY, supra note 165, at 136–37. 
213 See SEGAL, supra note 159, at 61, 63; DOTY, supra note 165, at 136–37; see also 
Winn, supra note 211, at 209 (describing ritual as “characterized by standardized, repetitive 
interpersonal symbolic actions, patterned according to social customs, which involve 
constant form over time, and which influence or orient human affairs”). 
214 See Cohen, supra note 168, at 343; DOTY, supra note 165, at 68. 
215 See SEGAL, supra note 159, at 4. 
216 See Winn, supra note 211, at 210. 
217 See DOTY, supra note 165, at 114. 
218 See id. (emphasis omitted). 
219 See Winn, supra note 211, at 231. 
220 SEGAL, supra note 159, at 139–40 (suggesting that the rags to riches myth can be 
seen “not as a false characterization of American life but as a hoped-for one”); see also Winn, 
supra note 211, at 231–32 (discussing symbolic value of Miranda warnings). 
221 Cf. Smith, supra note 178, at 1440 (suggesting that legal fictions, broadly defined, 
“serve functional goals and promote administrability in judicial process”). 
222 Id. at 1476. Smith uses the term “new legal fiction” to describe courts’ usage of 
descriptively inaccurate factual suppositions as the basis for choosing a legal role. Id. at 1441. 
As such, the term overlaps with my usage of the term “environmental myth.” 
223 Id. at 1476. 
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jury instructions despite evidence that they are often ineffective.224 In both instances, 
courts apparently deem the practical consequences of relinquishing the myths—
countless minitrials on the reliability of individual pieces of evidence or a 
proliferation of mistrials—as simply too damaging to the administration of justice 
and the functioning of the legal system.225 
The multiple functions of myth underscore the distinction between myths and 
mere stories. Myths, unlike stories, are socially significant beliefs that mediate 
relationships among humans and their institutions and between humanity and the 
external environment. 
 
V.  APPLYING MYTHOGRAPHY TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
What does the study of myth reveal about the myths of environmental law? 
Like the myths examined by sociologists and anthropologists, the myths of 
environmental law explain the world around us, express social values, and legitimize 
social, legal, and economic arrangements.  
 
A.  Myth as Explanation 
 
As described above, myths explain, typically by setting out a narrative, an 
ordering of events.226 The biblical Garden of Eden and other creation myths provide 
an obvious example of myth as narrative: they offer an account of how things came 
to be and why things are the way they are. Environmental law, which seeks to 
mediate the relationship between humans and the external environment, possesses 
its own secular counterpart to the Garden of Eden: the wilderness narrative, which 
depicts a time and state prior to human presence and activity.227 Both expressive and 
explanatory in nature, the wilderness narrative reflects “core values such as 
authenticity, freedom and purity.”228 
The myth of sustainable development serves a function similar to creation 
myths: it relates human beings to the rest of the universe, though in a different 
timeframe. In contrast to the wilderness narrative, which concerns idealized origins, 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 1476–77. 
226 See supra Part IV.B.1; see DOTY, supra note 165, at 42. 
227 The concept of wilderness and the valence associated with it has changed over time. 
See Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62, 90 (2010) 
(contrasting American colonists’ view of “wilderness as a threatening place” with subsequent 
“belief that wilderness offered desirable solitude and spiritual renewal”). See generally 
RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1967) (discussing various 
conceptions of wilderness). 
228 Michael Burger, Environmental Law/Environmental Literature, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
1, 17 (2013). 
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the sustainable development narrative points toward an idealized future.229 
Specifically, sustainable development describes a path to a state in which humans 
live in harmony with nature; it offers a redemptive vision of how humanity can enjoy 
the fruits of economic development without destroying the natural systems essential 
to such development and to life. Acknowledging the impossibility of returning to an 
Edenic paradise, sustainable development nevertheless suggests the possibility of 
peaceful coexistence. 
Other myths of environmental law are explanatory in that they assume—and 
present as true—a reductionist account of ecologically complex systems. 
Compensatory mitigation schemes rest on simplifying assumptions regarding the 
functional equivalence of existing wetlands and newly created ones. These schemes 
assume a seemingly heroic capacity to identify and reproduce all relevant wetland 
functions, yet at the same time they undervalue the environmental context in which 
specific wetlands exist.230 Carbon trading systems similarly involve drastic 
simplifications of complexity. In theory, carbon trading is attractive because climate 
change effects are indifferent to the exact location of carbon emissions, and trading 
schemes capitalize on the market’s ability to identify where emissions reductions 
can occur at lowest cost. In practice, however, complex systems of offsets and 
allowances are riddled with difficulties—conceptual and in implementation—that 
undercut the promised benefits of carbon trading schemes. 
Both pollution control schemes focused on industrial polluters and regulatory 
efforts premised on quantitative risk assessment techniques likewise rest on 
reductionist accounts. These myths bracket and disregard hazards or concerns that 
policymakers deem too difficult to address. The CWA and CAA hone in on major 
industrial sources, largely ignoring the significant contributions of individuals and 
other small sources.231 This seemingly reasonable approach fails to capture the 
complexities of pollution problems and does little to address the underlying social 
processes that generate pollution.232 Similarly, substantial uncertainties pervade the 
risk assessment process, yet existing regulatory schemes generally give them little 
or no weight.233 Such schemes proclaim established, quantified risks to be the only 
hazards worth worrying about, and assume away the existence of other, uncertain 
and therefore invisible hazards.234 These schemes also treat each source of risk as 
229 Cf. DOTY, supra note 165, at 94 (“Inasmuch as myths model possibilities—both 
positive and negative—we should not expect them to function along the lines of a how-to 
booklet.” (emphasis omitted)). 
230 See Robin Kundis Craig, Learning to Think About Complex Environmental Systems 
in Environmental and Natural Resource Law and Legal Scholarship: A Twenty-Year 
Retrospective, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 97 (2013). 
231 See Bobertz, supra note 107, at 737–39. 
232 See id. at 749 (criticizing American environmental law’s “preoccupation with 
pollution qua pollution”). 
233 Flournoy, supra note 68, at 820. 
234 Id. 
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discrete and thereby disregard cumulative and synergistic effects that would 
complicate regulatory oversight.235  
In each of these areas—wetlands mitigation, carbon markets, pollution control, 
and risk management—prediction plays a central role. Indeed, almost all of 
environmental law depends heavily on prediction, whether in anticipating the effects 
of development projects, determining whether an action will jeopardize a protected 
species, or constructing models for combating air or water pollution. Yet, as 
Professor Rodgers has observed: “In the art of predicting, self-deception is given 
free reign, especially as time-frames are stretched out, complicating factors are 
multiplied and condition-dependent qualifiers are enacted.”236 The self-deception 
reflected in environmental myths flourishes amid the uncertainty and complexity 
surrounding environmental problems and the difficulty of detecting and measuring 
environmental harm.237  
The reductionism common to these myths runs counter to the foundational 
insights of ecology. Ecology teaches that the environment consists of complex, 
interconnected, and dynamic systems that are more than the sum of their parts.238 
Indeed, the “uncertainty and unpredictability [of the environment] are inherent 
limitations on the legal system’s ability to perfectly control and regulate its 
subjects.”239 The myths embodied in reductionist accounts may make the challenges 
of environmental regulation more manageable, but they leave our regulatory regimes 
vulnerable to surprise and error.240 
One danger consequently posed by explanatory myths is that we will lose sight 
of the complexities leading to the myths. Compounding that danger are the 
incentives of vested interests to promote explanatory myths that weaken the case for 
careful oversight. However, laws and policies can be modified to counter these 
concerns. Thus, while risk assessment is essential to the management of toxic risks, 
such management should consider and in some instances act upon the uncertain 
hazards that risk assessment fails to quantify. Similarly, the tradeoffs reflected in 
wetlands mitigation schemes may be worthwhile from society’s perspective, but the 
loss of natural wetlands should be understood as the loss of a unique resource and 
not as the loss of a commodity that can be readily exchanged and replaced. Even the 
235 Id. 
236 Rodgers, supra note 1, at 573; see also James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy 
and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and 
Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 960 (2005) (discussing various sources of uncertainty in 
modeling of air quality). 
237 Rodgers, supra note 141, at 299. 
238 See Craig, supra note 230, at 88–92; see also J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A 
Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 891–93 (2008) (describing complex adaptive systems). 
239 Craig, supra note 230, at 92. 
240 J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution 
of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1444 
(1996) (“[I]t is precisely because we have approached the regulation of the environment . . . 
in the reductionist manner of Classical Science that we have encountered more surprises than 
the legal system can bear in the long run.”). 
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concept of sustainable development poses the danger of oversimplification and 
warrants close scrutiny. From one point of view, sustainable development articulates 
an idealized, vastly improved relationship between humanity and nature. 
Nonetheless, the concept fails to question the necessity for development itself and 
threatens to lead to a state of affairs that is not truly sustainable.  
 
B.  The Expressive Functions of Environmental Myths 
 
Laws do not merely govern behavior; they also express social values.241 More 
than declarative statements, these expressions reinforce, change, or create social 
norms.242 Specific examples from environmental law include the Endangered 
Species Act, which represents “a certain conception of the relationship between 
human beings and their environment,” and mandatory recycling laws, which make 
a social statement regarding recycling’s importance.243 
More generally, Professor Bradley C. Bobertz has sketched out an expressive 
theory of environmental law that highlights its “scapegoating” function.244 This 
theory proposes that environmental laws scapegoat industry and other readily 
identifiable sources of pollution, thereby externalizing blame for pollution on 
outside forces.245 This scapegoating process reinforces the myth that individuals are 
not a significant cause of environmental problems and allows “us”—the individuals 
whose activities are ultimately responsible for the pollution—to continue with our 
environmentally destructive lifestyles.246 
Other myths of environmental law express social values as well. Emissions 
trading systems provide an instructive example. These market-based mechanisms 
arguably set forth a particular conception of the environment as a commodity, 
leading many in the environmental community to object to them.247 Some critics 
argue that the commodification of emissions is intrinsically problematic in that it 
expresses an inaccurate or wrongful view of environmental pollution.248 Others 
argue that the commodification of emissions undermines social norms of 
environmental protection, particularly the norm that pollution deserves moral 
condemnation.249 Indeed, while emissions trading schemes could be viewed as 
condemning pollution sources for imposing environmental externalities, the ease 
with which polluters can atone for those externalities—by holding or obtaining 
allowances—suggests that any condemnation is little more than a slap on the wrist. 
241 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2022–25 (1996). 
242 See id. at 2051. 
243 Id. at 2024. 
244 See Bobertz, supra note 107, at 714–15. 
245 Id. at 714–16. 
246 Id. 
247 See Sunstein, supra note 241, at 2045–46. 
248 See Vandenbergh, supra note 115, at 192, 201–02. 
249 See id. 
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Pollution trading systems not only express views about the environment as a 
commodity; they also make statements about different sources of pollution through 
offset provisions and the like. On the one hand, carbon offset mechanisms 
incorporate many pollution sources otherwise excluded from regulation, thereby 
sending a message about the significance of these various sources in contributing to 
climate change.250 On the other hand, the favorable treatment these sources often 
receive implies that emissions from these sources are not very important. 
Furthermore, the willingness to credit offsets for questionable emission reductions—
a particularly mythical aspect of these schemes—makes a mockery of more direct 
but costly efforts to reduce emissions. Notwithstanding offsets’ dubious 
environmental benefits and the difficulties in their implementation, carbon emission 
trading systems continue to use them widely. This fact ultimately reveals society’s 
unwillingness to undertake serious emission reductions, as well as its reluctance to 
admit to this unwillingness.  
The law’s use of risk assessment likewise conveys a message regarding the 
risks that matter to society. The predominant legal treatment of risk, under which 
safety is assumed in the absence of demonstrated risk, declares that uncertain risks 
simply do not matter. In addition to offering an illusory sense of control and 
objectivity, such an approach affirms innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
experimental endeavors.251 Yet as the myth of regulation without regard to cost 
suggests, even risks that are demonstrated to be significant may not matter to us as 
much as we claim they do. Consider the history of regulation under CAA Section 
109.252 The text of the statute focuses solely on protecting public health with “an 
adequate margin of safety,” without regard to cost, feasibility, or other factors.253 By 
enacting this law, Congress asserted the imperative of protecting public health and 
the environment, while condemning polluters and their activities.254 The fact that the 
EPA considers costs, notwithstanding this imperative, reveals a society torn between 
protecting health and avoiding substantial economic costs. When forced to choose 
between the two, society almost invariably favors economic interests, or at least 
gives them significant weight.255 At the same time, the myth of regulation without 
250 Cf. id. at 209–11 (contending that failure of environmental law to address individual 
sources of harm has bolstered the myth that individuals are not significant sources of harm); 
Babcock, supra note 108, at 125–26 (explaining that creating a new environment norm is 
particularly challenging because the American people believe numerous environmental 
myths). 
251 Bobertz, supra note 107, at 748; see INST. OF MED., supra note 65; see also Howard 
Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. REG. 89, 129 
(1988) (noting industry incentive to use uncertainty in risk assessment to obstruct regulation).  
252 See supra Part II.D. 
253 Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
254 Id. § 7409(b)(2); see also Vandenbergh, supra note 115, at 204–06 (discussing the 
social meaning of environmental statutes enacted in the 1970s); Dwyer, supra note 72, at 
248–49 (discussing symbolic environmental legislation). 
255 Cf. Driesen, supra note 81, at 223 (noting the believed tendency of government 
agencies “to undervalue environmental harms when implementing a cost/harm standard”); 
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regard to cost enables society to pay lip service to health and environmental 
concerns. As one commentator bluntly characterized this tension, “We wish to 
exorcise our demons, but still retain the pleasures of their company.”256 
Finally, the myth of sustainable development may be best understood in terms 
of its expressive function. No one would seriously contend that sustainable 
development accurately describes present practices. Nonetheless, numerous treaties, 
laws, and official documents proclaim sustainable development as an important 
goal. Sustainable development expresses society’s aspiration for achieving balance: 
balance between present generations and future generations, and balance between 
humanity and nature. These are goals society can agree on, even if the means for 
achieving these goals remain uncertain or controverted. 
One might argue, moreover, that sustainable development may be a useful 
framework even if it represents an unrealizable ideal. Sustainable development 
could serve as a catalyst for radical and necessary changes if it were to prompt a 
wholesale reconsideration of problematic systems and processes.257 Short of that, it 
could still bring about significant improvements to our world if honestly pursued.258 
Unfortunately, however, sustainable development is unlikely to prompt a drastic 
reconsideration of the status quo. Rooted in the dominant paradigm of economic 
growth, sustainable development proclaims that capitalism and globalization can 
continue, albeit with a few tweaks.259 These tweaks may reduce the damage inflicted 
on the environment at the margins, but in reality will not be enough to stave off 
climate change or other looming ecological disasters. Ultimately, sustainable 
development not only reinforces environmentally problematic practices, but even 
blesses economic systems and growth imperatives that have caused tremendous 
environmental damage.260 
  
Adam Babich, The Supremacy Clause, Cooperative Federalism, and the Full Federal 
Regulatory Purpose, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3 n.7 (2012) (“It is . . . not unusual for the law to 
favor economic interests over those favoring health protection and quality of life.”). 
256 Bobertz, supra note 107, at 748. 
257 See Markku Lehtonen & Florian Kern, Deliberative Socio-Technical Transitions, in 
ENERGY FOR THE FUTURE: A NEW AGENDA 103, 114 (Ivan Scrase & Gordon MacKerron 
eds., 2009) (“Utopian thinking may be a necessary condition for deliberate historical change, 
as it enables thinking of ‘alternative solutions to the festering problems of the present.’” 
(quoting ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, SOCIALISM: THE ACTIVE UTOPIA 13 (1976))). 
258 See Burger, supra note 119, at 10,356 (discussing the view that sustainability is 
“mostly harmless”). 
259 See Anton, supra note 144, at 218 (contending that present formulation of 
sustainable development “renders the environment a mere instrument of development and, 
presumably, today, of the green economy”). 
260 See Burger, supra note 119, at 10,356 (discussing the view that the concept of 
sustainable development “brackets big-ticket items like capitalism and consumerism, reifies 
existing actors and hierarchies, and affirms basic patterns of social organization, production, 
and consumption”). 
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C.  The Legitimizing and Ritualistic Functions of Environmental Myths 
 
Indeed, the myth of sustainable development illustrates how the explanatory 
function of environmental legal myths intersects with their legitimizing and 
ritualistic functions. Retracing the history of sustainable development, Professor 
Donald K. Anton argues that the concept gradually has been “co-opted by 
environmentally ambivalent or hostile agendas” into a philosophy for continued 
economic growth.261 Sustainable development simultaneously expresses a societal 
goal; explains how to achieve that goal; and legitimizes systems of capitalism, 
economic development, and consumerism as consistent with the goal. Thus, 
sustainable development’s descriptive explanation of how things are, as well as its 
normative account of how things should be, reinforces existing social practices and 
institutions. 
The myth that individuals are not a significant cause of environmental problems 
similarly legitimizes the status quo. The myth instructs that environmental problems 
can be resolved by regulating utilities, manufacturers, businesses, government 
agencies, and other nations—anyone but ourselves. The reality is that individuals 
contribute to these problems through their personal patterns of behavior as well as 
their participation in global economic and social systems.262 Yet like sustainable 
development, the myth of individual insignificance reassures us that personal 
sacrifices for the common good or for the future are not necessary. Rather, by 
shifting the regulatory burden to others, we can have our cake and eat it too.  
Other environmental myths also legitimize activities that might otherwise be 
subject to societal condemnation. Laws that prohibit the destruction of wetlands or 
other habitat express a valuation for these environmental goods and condemn their 
destruction. For actors who undertake these destructive activities, however, 
mitigation programs offer a form of penance.263 The frequent failure of mitigation 
to truly make up for resource damage suggests that these programs have aims apart 
from ensuring no net harm to the environment. These programs have an important 
ritualistic purpose as well: mitigation offers a means for reintegrating into good 
society the offender of environmental norms. 
A similar analysis applies to pollution trading programs. These programs 
recognize pollution as harmful and perhaps even wrongful, but offer a ritual—the 
possession and eventual surrender of allowances—to absolve polluters of their 
wrongs. This is not to say that these programs are solely ritualistic. If properly 
implemented, they can make strides towards reducing pollution. The incorporation 
of offsets into such programs, however, has tended to undermine their environmental 
effectiveness and indicates that goals other than pollution reduction are also at work. 
261 Anton, supra note 144, at 215. 
262 See Bobertz, supra note 107, at 748. 
263 For a discussion of the concept of penance, see Marc O. DeGirolami, The New 
Religious Prisons and Their Retributivist Commitments, 59 ARK. L. REV. 1, 21–23 (2006). 
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As mythographic analysis reveals, these programs gently condemn various sources 
of pollution while simultaneously offering a method for erasing that condemnation. 
Risk assessment is yet another form of ritual. Risk assessments are of course 
essential to the rational operation of environmental law and other bodies of 
regulatory law. They enable the development of protective measures and rules to 
address identified risks and, more rarely, lead to the prohibition of activities deemed 
to be too hazardous. At the same time, risk assessments also serve to legitimize the 
activities of modern industrial society. Incorporated into the risk management 
process, risk assessments declare that such activities may continue, subject to some 
limits. In this context, risk assessments become important rituals for describing the 
indescribable and controlling the uncontrollable. 
Professor Bobertz contends that environmental lawmaking in general has 
become a ritual for expiating our collective guilt for destroying our environment:  
 
Without commonly accepted religious ceremonies to expiate guilt, 
Americans turn instead to the sanctifying rituals of lawmaking. . . . In 
environmental law, we have our own sacred clerics, scapegoats, and rites 
of redemption, even though they inhabit the seemingly asectarian world of 
law and politics. Indeed, the inherent spiritualism associated with nature 
provides a special religiosity to environmental lawmaking, as twenty-five 
years of incantatory rhetoric from the mouths of our leaders amply 
prove.264  
 
The environmental laws we have enacted—like the concept of sustainable 
development—allow us to avoid questioning the fundamental processes of 
capitalism and consumerism that drive modern society.265 
Indeed, reflection on the environmental myths discussed above reveals that in 
one way or another, each myth facilitates the continuation of “business as usual.” 
Wetland mitigation programs, carbon cap-and-trade systems, risk assessment, and 
even sustainable development largely do not disturb existing economic practices. 
The myths of regulation without regard to cost and of individual insignificance 
likewise mask the absence of the radical transformation that may be needed. While 
softening the sharpest edges of existing practices and extracting modest 
compensation in the process, all these myths leave intact the global systems of 
production and consumption that are at the root of many environmental problems. 
Moreover, by regularizing market exchanges of environmental amenities, these 
myths further strengthen the capitalist foundations of modern society. Monetization 
of environmental resources becomes a norm, as does the assumption that resources 
are fungible, subject to exchange for other environmental—or nonenvironmental—
resources. The result is an even greater dominance of environmental law by a 
264 Bobertz, supra note 107, at 748. 
265 Cf. id. (“By acting with righteous vehemence against the visible end-products of 
pollution, we avoid asking harder questions about global resource allocation and the 
sustainability of existing industrial, agricultural, and personal patterns of behavior.”). 
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market-based, consequentialist paradigm featuring cost-benefit analysis as its 
leading analytical tool.266 
 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS 
 
Myth’s common presence in environmental law and beyond suggests that the 
existence of myth may be inevitable. Myths offer an empowering response to the 
unavoidable uncertainty societies and individuals face in confronting environmental 
problems and other challenges. If myths are inevitable, what can or should we do 
about them? This Part offers several recommendations: developing a greater 
awareness of myth in environmental law, addressing shortcomings in the law 
thereby revealed by applying an “Environmental Hippocratic principle,” and 
rejecting or replacing those myths that undermine environmental law’s goals. 
 
A.  Awareness of Myth and Lessons for Existing Environmental Law 
 
Notwithstanding its critical tone, this Article does not seek to discredit 
environmental law or to call for its complete overhaul. Environmental law has halted 
or reversed many destructive trends and provides important protections to public 
health and the environment. It is flawed, but perhaps no more so than other areas of 
law. 
An awareness of the myths at work in environmental law, however, can enable 
stronger implementation of existing laws and better design of future laws. In some 
instances, the myths describe failures in implementation. To fix these failures is 
conceptually easy, though perhaps politically difficult.267 Even where conceptual 
flaws are at work, there may be ways to counter some of the law’s shortcomings. In 
wetlands mitigation, for example, demanding higher mitigation ratios can increase 
the likelihood that mitigation projects will effectively compensate for the functions 
lost through the destruction of a natural wetland. Likewise, discounting of carbon 
offsets can reflect the uncertainty that the offsets actually represent avoided or 
reduced carbon emissions. Implementing and monitoring stringent certification 
requirements for offsets also can promote offset integrity.268 
Moreover, a healthy appreciation of environmental law’s myths can prompt 
more vigorous engagement with the problems that the law seeks to address. We can 
ask probing questions and have a more transparent dialogue about the means and 
ends of environmental law.269 With respect to statutes that purport to regulate 
without regard to cost, for instance, we might debate the desirability of eliminating 
particular risks without considering the price of doing so. On the one hand, the cost-
266 See Purdy, supra note 107, at 860. 
267 See supra Part III.A. 
268 See Ramo, supra note 50, at 152–53. 
269 Cf. Flournoy, supra note 68, at 823 (noting that “[a]nalytic techniques that present 
what we know while acknowledging the limits of our knowledge” can “make regulatory 
decisions more accessible to the public and thus more democratic”). 
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benefit paradigm that dominates modern policy discourse makes the weighing of 
costs seem natural. On the other hand, the language of cost-blind statutes has an 
appealing ring to it, absolute and almost rights-like in nature. Contemplating what 
the CAA seeks to achieve may initiate a process of eventually recognizing a right to 
clean air or other environmental goods.270 Similarly, the ESA might be read to imply 
a right of individual plant and animal species to exist.271  
Likewise, deconstructing the myth of sustainable development can lead us to 
reconsider the fundamental assumptions that underlie our modern economic and 
social systems. In addition to adopting concrete measures that actually are 
sustainable, we might think about alternatives to sustainability. Rather than taking a 
“cradle to grave” approach to designing products and processes, innovators might 
take a “cradle to cradle” approach in which products and their components are 
designed with repurpose and reuse in mind.272 Beyond that, we might reevaluate the 
adequacy of income, wealth, and consumption as indices of national and global well-
being and look instead to alternatives that can better measure life satisfaction and 
quality of life.273 We might even question the imperative of economic growth and 
ponder what sort of society and world we want to live in.274 
Ultimately, awareness of the myths of environmental law at least can cultivate 
a healthy skepticism toward the legal solutions we adopt. The myths remind us that 
law serves not only as a system for organizing behavior towards social ends, but also 
as an exercise of political power by competing interests. Awareness of the myths of 
environmental law can also engender a fitting sense of humility. No matter the effort 
and resources that society pours into risk assessments, pollution trading systems, and 
the like, environmental law cannot control all aspects of the natural world. We 
270 Cf. Driesen, supra note 81, at 220 (suggesting the health protection goal of CAA 
section 109 may reflect the belief that people “have a right to breathe air that will not cause 
them to become ill or die”). 
271 Cf. Andrea Olive & Leigh Raymond, Reconciling Norm Conflict in Endangered 
Species Conservation on Private Land, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 431, 432 (2010) (suggesting 
that ESA protections could be framed in terms of a “species’ intrinsic right to exist”). 
272 See WILLIAM MCDONOUGH & MICHAEL BRAUNGART, THE UPCYCLE: BEYOND 
SUSTAINABILITY—DESIGNING FOR ABUNDANCE 7–13 (2013) (advocating moving beyond 
sustainability to a system of “upcycling”). 
273 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Remarks at the 32nd General Conference of the International Association for Research in 
Income and Wealth: Economic Measurement 4 (Aug. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120806a.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/LAL9-QKU3. 
274 See, e.g., JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: 
CAPITALISM, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY 7–13 
(2008) (“[M]ost environmental deterioration is a result of systemic failures of the capitalism 
that we have today[,] and . . . long-term solutions must seek transformative change in the key 
features of this contemporary capitalism.”). 
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should expect surprises and accordingly temper our actions, while developing 
capabilities of resilience.275 
 
B.  Developing and Applying an Environmental Hippocratic Principle 
 
Further, our appreciation of the myths of environmental law may warrant the 
application of a general rule of thumb for dealing with environmental problems. The 
environmental myths reveal the shortcomings of the tools of environmental law: 
mitigation schemes fail to make up for lost resources, risk assessments fail to 
account for relevant hazards, and cost considerations dilute nominally health-based 
standards. One means of countering these shortcomings is to apply to environmental 
policymaking processes a presumption in favor of less disruptive and less harmful 
actions. Such a presumption would recognize the seemingly inevitable slippage that 
occurs when valuable environmental resources are destroyed. We might call this 
presumption the Environmental Hippocratic principle: avoiding harm to the 
environment to the extent possible.276  
How might this principle be implemented in a concrete way? The mitigation 
sequence for CWA Section 404 provides a useful starting point to consider: 
applicants are to first seek to avoid impacts, then to minimize impacts that are 
unavoidable, and finally to compensate for impacts that remain.277 In contrast to 
current practice, however, compensatory mitigation should be treated as a last resort, 
rather than as an option readily subject to government approval. 
Similarly, the federal government might apply the Environmental Hippocratic 
principle to its planning processes under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA). As written, NEPA requires the federal government to analyze the 
environmental impacts of its actions and to consider a reasonable range of alternative 
actions, including a no-action alternative; it does not mandate any substantive 
result.278 Forceful application of the Environmental Hippocratic principle could give 
rise to a substantive requirement that the government adopt less environmentally 
destructive actions that achieve a desired goal in lieu of more destructive 
alternatives.279 But even a more modest application of the principle could have 
275 See Craig & Benson, supra note 130, at 862–68; see generally J.B. Ruhl, General 
Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—With 
Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373 (2011) (examining 
resilience and how to design for it in legal systems). 
276 The Hippocratic Oath is commonly believed to reflect the principle that physicians 
should do no harm, although those exact words do not actually appear in the oath. See 
Howard Markel, “I Swear by Apollo”—On Taking the Hippocratic Oath, 350 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2026, 2026 (2004). A similar oath has been proposed to govern scientists. See Joseph 
Rotblat, A Hippocratic Oath for Scientists, 286 SCIENCE 1475, 1475 (1999).  
277 See supra Part II.A. 
278 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 
519, 557–58 (1978); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d) (2013). 
279 This would be comparable to the CEQA prohibition on an agency approving a 
project with adverse environmental impacts if there exist feasible alternatives or mitigation 
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positive effects by requiring the government to take a hard look at less 
environmentally destructive alternatives and if appropriate, to justify their rejection. 
The Environmental Hippocratic principle could apply to risk management 
decisions as well and help to recognize the limitations of risk assessment. One 
concrete way of doing so would be to incorporate a preference for options involving 
greater environmental certainty over those involving lesser certainty into risk 
management decisions. Such a preference could be considered along with other, 
more typical decision-making criteria. Current environmental policy discussions 
already reflect this preference to some degree. For example, one reason for climate 
change policymakers to prefer mitigation over adaptation is the greater uncertainty 
associated with adapting to new and indeterminate climate regimes.280 Similarly, in 
geoengineering policy debates, the general preference for carbon dioxide removal 
techniques—which reduce atmospheric carbon concentrations—over solar radiation 
management techniques—which seek to block solar radiation but do nothing to 
reduce carbon concentrations—reflects a preference for greater environmental 
certainty.281 Such a preference could be applied in other environmental policy areas 
as well. For example, all else being equal, chemical regulation could favor the use 
of well-studied substances with no known harmful effects over substances with little 
toxicity data. 
Another approach would be to identify a policy option’s consequences that are 
plausible yet unacceptable, to give weighted consideration to those consequences, 
and perhaps even to prefer options that avoid those consequences.282 Applying just 
such an approach to climate change, Professor Daniel A. Farber argues that 
“[c]limate policy cannot be based simply on the outcomes we consider most likely,” 
but must find a way to “take seriously that there is even a small possibility that 
climate change could wipe out our present society.”283 Under this analysis, strong 
mitigation efforts would be justified even if most people believe catastrophic climate 
consequences unlikely.284 
  
measures to reduce those impacts. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21002, 21081 (West 2007 & 
Supp. 2014). 
280 See Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources 
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1411 (2011). 
281 See ALBERT C. LIN, PROMETHEUS REIMAGINED: TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT, AND 
LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 139–40 (2013). 
282 Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 943–44 (2011). 
283 Id. 
284 Id. To some degree, application of an Environmental Hippocratic principle may 
overlap with application of the precautionary principle insofar as both principles explicitly 
recognize the importance of uncertainty. However, the former provides more concrete 
guidance than the latter, which has been criticized for involving little more than a general 
admonition to “take care.” Id. at 917, 958. 
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C.  Developing Better Myths 
 
Finally, armed with our understanding of the importance of myths, we should 
develop new, more functional myths. Legal myths create and reinforce perceptions 
of reality: the law’s focus on industrial polluters has reinforced the myth that 
individuals do not contribute significantly to environmental problems, just as 
mitigation schemes have bolstered the assumption that environmental resources are 
readily fungible. In some instances, deconstructing the myth and removing its traces 
from the law may suffice. For example, reducing or eliminating the use of carbon 
offsets could be an adequate response to the questionable emissions reductions 
associated with these offsets. In other instances, however, further actions may be 
necessary. As the concept of sustainable development illustrates, myths can be 
powerful narratives that attract support, become incorporated into law, and motivate 
action, notwithstanding the fictions that lie just beneath the surface. At the heart of 
the sustainable development myth is not only a conceptual error, but also a broad 
paradigm for all human activity. 
We will have to cultivate more compelling and powerful narratives to displace 
foundational myths like sustainable development.285 Sustainable development 
seems to have lost much of its value as a driving force for the changes needed to 
address environmental threats.286 It nonetheless fills a deep need for a way to 
conceptualize the relationship between humanity and the environment. We must 
brainstorm and explore alternative ways of thinking about this relationship, perhaps 
building on existing ideas—whether Gaia theory,287 creation myths, or other 
notions—or constructing myths that are completely new. Ultimately, coming up 
with a successor to sustainable development and other myths is no easy task and lies 
beyond the scope of this Article. But it is essential for scholars and practitioners of 
environmental law and environmentalism to take on this challenge in the years 
ahead. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Myths are widespread in environmental law. While it may be tempting to 
dismiss their significance, these myths explain ecologically complex systems, 
express social values, and reinforce social structures and economic systems. 
Moreover, the myths of environmental law involve more than easily fixed errors in 
legal design, mere shortcomings in implementing the law, or harmless stories 
concerning the world around us. The myths rest on conceptual flaws that make 
impossible the achievement of specific statutory and societal goals. Indeed, the 
conceptual flaws themselves reveal disguised policy choices and unresolved 
conflicts that threaten the entire enterprise of environmental law. Deconstructing and 
285 See Langevoort, supra note 176, at 1597. 
286 See Anton, supra note 144, at 217–19. 
287 See James Lovelock, Gaia: The Living Earth, 426 NATURE 769, 769–70 (2003). 
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understanding the myths is an important first step towards countering this threat. 
Moving beyond these myths and, where appropriate, constructing new myths will 
be critical for the future of environmental law and humanity’s relationship with the 
natural world.  
